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ABSTRACT
Officially, the Navy Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps' (NJROTC)
mission is to educate high school students on the value of citizenship, public service,
and personal responsibility. Since 1916, proponents and opponents have debated the
value of the various Junior ROTC programs; however, there has been little empirical
research that describes the extent to which these programs have actually benefited the
services. As such, the purpose of this study was to examine the NJROTC program by
analyzing the impact program participation has on Navy accessions and retentions
from 2001 to 2005.
The methodology used in this study was an exclusively quantitative analysis of
pre-existing data from two large population databases: The Navy JROTC Unit
Management System, which included career intent information on 39,745 NJROTC
graduates from 2001 to 2005; the other database, from the Defense Management Data
Center, provided demographic data on 211,076 Navy accessions from 2001 to 2005.
Analysis of these databases revealed that NJROTC graduates' intent to join the
military clearly benefits the Navy as a resource for recruiting; specifically, while
there were small but positive differences in Naval accessions for most NJROTC
participants, there were larger positive differences for women and African-American
participants. In the final part of the analysis, a binary logistic regression model was
created analyzing retention among several predictor variables; results indicated that
the primary predictor variable, NJROTC accessions, were 45 percent more likely to
be retained than non-NJROTC accessions after holding all other predictor variables
constant.

Taken together, the findings of this study have demonstrated that during the
2001-2005 period, NJROTC operated as both a citizenship training program and a
source of recruiting for the Navy. As such, there are a number of recommendations
for further research; the first, and perhaps most immediate would be for the Navy to
conduct a cost-benefit analysis to determine geographically where it makes sense to
grant full participation to the 198 schools on the waiting list; the second, and perhaps
most important, would involve survey research that targets NJROTC stakeholders to
find out what the response would be if the Navy openly declared NJROTC as a
recruiting tool.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps (JROTC), managed by the four
U.S. military services—the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps—is the largest
federally-funded high school character education program in the nation. JROTC s
mission is to educate high school students as to the values of citizenship, public
service, personal responsibility, and to teach a sense of self-worth (Junior Reserve
Officer Training Corps, 2005). While few disagree with the mission of JROTC, there
is a longstanding debate concerning the appropriateness of a publicly financed,
militarily administered program in high schools (Berlowitz, 2001; Walls, 2003;
Trasvina, J. 2007; Barbassa, 2008; Johnson, 2008). Proponents have noted JROTC's
discernible impact on personal values and educational outcomes. Opponents, on the
other hand, have cited two essential arguments: (a) high schools should not be used as
military training facilities, and (b) the Department of Defense (DoD) military budget
should not be used to fund what is perceived to be a luxury citizenship training
program (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001).
From a historical perspective, the National Defense Act of 1916 established
the Army JROTC program as part of the World War I military expansion. The first
JROTC program provided training for Army officers only (Hawkins, 1988). The
ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964 added the Navy and Air Force JROTC programs and
included funding for the expansion of the number of units from 254 to 1200 units
(Reserve Officers' Training Vitalization Act of 1964).
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JROTC continues to be a popular program with Congress. However, even with
congressional support, JROTC is experiencing funding shortages for instructors,
material, and equipment. Financial and accountability pressures make it likely that
the Navy, as well as the other services, will have to justify funds allocated for their
respective JROTC programs, as affirmed in the following quotation:
If history is any guide, JROTC's bright future could quickly change. Many
uniformed resource managers looking at a program's fiscal bottom line rather
than its long-term but unquantifiable effects on civil-military relations and
moral development of the Nation's youth will undoubtedly continue to view
JROTC as an expensive luxury. (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001, p. 81)
The Navy JROTC program is a cooperative effort funded in part by the military
and in part by the local school district where the NJROTC Unit is located. The Naval
Service Training Center (NSTC), located in Chicago, which manages the NJROTC
program, claims, based on mostly anecdotal evidence, that an NJROTC Unit benefits
the student as well as the community. For example, NSTC asserts that cadets gain
personal satisfaction and improve their self-esteem by belonging to the NJROTC
team. It should be noted that the NJROTC offers schools the opportunity to
incorporate basic elements of citizenship and leadership into the curriculum. The
NJROTC further states that these units support the school with community service
projects as well as military ceremonial functions.
Although NSTC does not advocate NJROTC as a military recruiting program,
NJROTC cadets do get special consideration for college ROTC scholarships and
appointments to the U.S. Naval Academy and are entitled to advanced promotion in
the military upon enlistment (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS],
1999). While the NJROTC mission statement does not specifically identify accession
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incentives as a form of Navy recruiting some consider these incentives as a form of
Navy recruiting.
The NJROTC budget for fiscal year 2008 was $62 million, with the hosting
schools' share coupled with instructors' retirement pay, $50 and $100 million
respectively. Thus, according to NJROTC staff in Pensacola, FL, the total anticipated
cost for the over 92,685 cadets enrolled in 624 NJROTC units was $212 million
(Teresa Casey, NJROTC Headquarters Staff, personal communication, February 27,
2009).
Based on a review of the JROTC literature, the military service JROTC
programs appear to produce positive social benefits, such as Cadet's feeling included
in a group, when JROTC participants are compared to their non-JROTC peers.
Further, the majority of the research supports the claim of JROTC's positive social
benefits using survey instruments as the primary research method (Bailey, Hodak,
Sheppard, & Hassen, 1992; Demoulin & Ritter, 2000; Flowers, 1999; Kilted, Solver,
& Ritter, 1999; Kolstad & Ritter, 2000; Reiger & Demoulin, 2000; Roberts, 1991;
Schmidt, 2001, 2003a, b; Walls, 2003). Community stakeholders in the area in which
the JROTC unit resides also tend to hold positive perceptions of JROTC instructors
(Logan, 2000; Marks, 2004; Perusse, 1997). Although the literature cites JROTC in a
good light, there have been recent initiatives by those who oppose JROTC to
pressure school boards to close down units, initiatives such as citing equal
opportunity concerns for homosexuals and women, as well as removing physical
education credit and eliminating air rifle competitions (Cdr. Vizcarra, personal
communication, February 27, 2009; Barbassa, 2008).
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Additionally, anecdotal and limited empirical evidence suggest that JROTC
cadets have a greater propensity to join the military than do their non-JROTC peers
(Days & Ang, 2004; Laurence & Estrada, 2003). Curiously, increased military
accessions are seldom voiced as a goal by the respective service JROTC program
representatives, primarily for the reason that JROTC units may not be welcomed in
high schools if the program is identified as a military recruiting program (Days &
Ang, 2003).
Four studies, all sponsored by the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Monterey,
CA, provide quantifiable evidence on the JROTC program as it relates to recruiting
and retaining military personnel. These studies provided an essential foundation to
this research, which focuses on the Navy JROTC program. Pertinent findings from
these studies are described in the "Review of the Literature" in Chapter 2. The first
study noted there (Days & Ang, 2004), is an empirical examination of the impact of
JROTC participation on enlistment, retention, and attrition. The researchers analyzed
data from the 1980 "High School and Beyond" (HS&B) survey database and the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) enlisted personnel cohort files (1980 to
2000). The second study by Laurence and Estrada (2003) also used DMDC data and
provides a comprehensive review of the curriculum, budgeting issues, and
recruitment. In the third NPS-sponsored study, Walls (2003) compared JROTC with
other successful youth programs, such as Boys and Girls Clubs, Scouts, YMCA,
YWCA, 4-H, Camp Fire, religious youth programs, sports programs, and others.
Walls concluded his study with an analysis using DMDC data on military recruits
who participated in JROTC. The fourth (Hentz & Packwood, 2007) investigated
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whether JROTC participation significantly impacts first-term attrition, promotion,
reenlistment, time to attrition, and time to promotion. This study analyzed DMDC
data from 1994-2000. The results of the various studies indicated that JROTC had a
statistically positive association with promotion, reenlistment and time to attrition.
While each of the NPS studies provided information regarding the potential effect of
JROTC participation on military enlistment and retention, these studies were focused
on larger JROTC programmatic issues and incorporated only limited empirical
evidence on the Navy JROTC program.
An examination of the NJROTC impact on recruiting and retention is of interest
to Navy policymakers who have budget responsibility over NJROTC, recruitment,
and administrative discharge costs; however, there is limited information on the
impact NJROTC has on Navy recruiting. One of the reasons is that studies to date
have focused on all the service programs. Secondly, emphasizing NJROTC as a
recruiting tool in high schools can be problematic. Given that there are stakeholders
who oppose the Navy on high school campuses for any reason, the Navy chooses to
highlight the character education aspects of teaching citizenship and leadership,
which, as previously reported, seems to have a positive social benefit. However,
given the mandate for Navy program managers to provide measures of effectiveness
of their program, quantifying the net benefits and costs of NJROTC participation will
give Navy policymakers additional data to make a more informed decision with
respect to the cost effectiveness of the NJROTC program.
If it can be shown with quantifiable data that NJROTC participants join and are
retained in the Navy at a higher rate than non-NJROTC participants, then it may be
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assumed that there is an incentive to use NJROTC as a source of recruitment.
Combining this premise with the fact that it costs an average of $11,000 to recruit an
enlisted person and less than $5,000 to train an NJROTC cadet, one could make a
cost saving argument to use NJROTC as a pipeline-training program (Laurence &
Estrada, 2003).
In addition, in 2005 and 2008, two Chiefs of Naval Operations (CNO) stated in
the Navy's diversity policy that they wanted to improve the representation of the
Navy with respect to diversity (Admiral Michael Mullen, personal communication,
September 22, 2005; Admiral Gary Roughhead, personal communication, March 3,
2008). One notable Navy diversity statistic is that fewer than 7.4 percent of the Navy
officer corps is Black compared to 13 percent in the general population. Black
NJROTC representation for the past 10 years has been about 34 percent. This in itself
adds further substantiation to explore NJROTC as a pipeline-recruiting tool for
officers representing diverse backgrounds. If empirical evidence were available that
showed NJROTC positively influences their cadets to pursue a career and remain in
the Navy, then program managers could use this supportive recruiting and retention
evidence for the continued funding of the program. This evidence could also support
other cost-saving endeavors, such as using NJROTC as a pipeline-training program to
decrease time-to-train requirements or as a relatively cheaper recruiting tool.
Statement of the Problem
While current literature shows the potential positive impact of JROTC
participation on values and educational performance, there is a paucity of evidence as
to the benefit to the military relative to JROTC's programmatic costs. Furthermore,
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there is limited information on JROTC relative recruiting and retention in all services
including with little or no empirical evidence on the Navy JROTC program. The
focus of this study is the Navy's JROTC program.
Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this study was to determine whether NJROTC participation has
an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. If, as some argue, NJROTC
participation positively influences Navy accessions and retentions, then policymakers
could be made aware of the costs and benefits of NJROTC relative to other Navy
recruiting programs. On the other hand, if NJROTC participation does not
significantly influence Navy accessions and retentions, then the arguments of those
seeking to reduce or eliminate NJROTC expenditures gain credence. By providing
empirical evidence of NJROTC's effect on Navy accessions and retentions, the
ongoing debate in the literature will be clarified.
Methodology
The data for the intentions of graduating NJROTC students were obtained from
the Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) Navy JROTC Unit Management
System (JUMS). The data for Navy enlisted personnel were obtained from the
Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC). Both data sources offer demographic data
supporting the purpose of this study, which was to assess the impact NJROTC has on
Navy accessions and retentions. NJROTC graduates were the study's primary
subjects of consideration. The impact to the study participants was virtually nonexistent given the fact the researcher cannot identify a case record with a given
NJROTC cadet in the JUMS data or a given Navy accessions in the DMDC data.
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The methodology for this study was a quantitative analysis of pre-existing data.
Descriptive and inferential statistical analysis techniques, including logistic
regression analysis, were employed to provide empirical evidence for the following
research questions and hypotheses:
Research Question 1: What are the NJROTC graduates' post-high school
career intentions by race, gender, location, and socioeconomic status?
Research Question 2: Are there significant differences between NJROTC
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted accessions (DMDC
data) by race, gender, Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score, location, and
socioeconomic status? This research question to leads to:
Hypothesis 1; Among Navy enlisted accessions, there is no significant
difference between those who participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC students.
Research Question 3: Are there significant differences between NJROTC
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted retention by race,
gender, AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status? This research question
leads to:
Hypothesis 2: Among Navy enlisted personnel who are retained in the Navy,
there is no significant difference between those who participated in NJROTC and
non-NJROTC students. This research question leads to:
Research Question 4: Is there a significant difference between NJROTC
graduate cadets' intent to enlist in the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender,
and location? This research question leads to:
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Hypothesis 3: There is no difference between the JUMS database on NJROTC
cadet graduates' intent to enlist and those who actually enlist in the Navy.
Significance of the Study
The increasing significance of this study addresses the fact that since September
11, 2001, the day of the infamous terrorist attacks against the U.S., the Navy has
directed all Navy program managers to justify their programs based on priorities to
support the Global War on Terror (GWOT). Funding a citizenship-training program
did not make the list of priorities; on the other hand, recruiting a quality force
representing the diversity of America did make the list (U.S. Department of the Navy,
2004). Consequently, if it can be shown that NJROTC cadets, join and remain in the
Navy at a higher rate than non-NJROTC students join and remain, then there is
evidence to consider the NJROTC as a Navy pipeline-recruiting or training program.
Added evidence would also be gained if it can be shown as a source for the
recruitment of minorities to meet Navy diversity goals.
Definitions of Key Terms
The following are definitions of specific terms used in this study:
Accessions: These are recruits who enter the Navy as enlisted personnel or
students who are selected for a Navy officer entry programs.
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT): AFQT scores are a measure of
recruits' qualification for potential military services. These scores are divided
into five categories (I, II, IIIA, IIIB, IV, and V), with Category I being the
highest. The categories are sub-divided into percentiles based on a potential
recruits' scores on the test (Cat I - 93-99%; CAT II - 65-92%; CAT IIIA -
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50-64%; CAT IIIB - 31-49%; CAT IV 10-30%; and CAT V - 1-9%). In FY
2004, over 70% of the Navy enlisted accessions' came from Categories I-IIIA,
which represent recruits with scores above the 50th percentile.
Attrition: Enlisted personnel who fail to complete their first term of enlistment.
For this study, recruits who leave the Navy within the first three years of their
enlistment provided the metric for attrition. Those who remain in the Navy for
those three years were considered retained.
Cadet: A student enrolled in any of the four service JROTC programs.
First-Term Enlistment: The first term of enlistment for the Navy is based on
the time a recruit is obligated to serve to complete the enlistment contract.
This is normally 36 months.
Defense Management Data Center (DMDC): DMDC provides the military a
variety of military demographic data. The data of concern for this study were
demographic data on Navy accessions from 2001 to 2005.
Gender: The military is a male-dominated organization based on an 85 percent
male to female ratio. There are four primary reasons for this: (1) women have
a lower inclination to enlist; (2) current combat policies exclude women; (3)
Growth must come from within. Lateral entries, entries from outside the
military, have no significant impact; and (4) women leave the service at a
higher rate than do men.
Global War on Terror (GWOT): The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon have thrust the U.S. into a new age of
instability in an effort to fight terrorists around the world.
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Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps (JROTC): A high school militarysupported citizenship training program that is represented by the following
four services: Army - AJROTC; Navy - NJROTC; Air Force - AFJROTC;
and Marine Corps - MJROTC. The college program is named the ROTC
program.
JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS): The JUMS database provides
NJROTC leaders with up-to-date information on student enrollment
demographics and financial accounting of the unit expenses. It is also used to
record NJROTC career intent upon graduation from high school.
Officer Candidate School (OCS): Officer Candidate School is a 90-day training
program designed to train cadets to become Navy officers.
Location: Location measures, such as the NJROTC 11 Geographic Areas and
five U.S. regions, were controlled statistically to determine whether there
were any significant demographic differences based on geographic location.
Race: Race is represented by the following categories: White, Black, Asian,
Hispanic, and Other, and were analyzed for the JROTC Unit Management
System (JUMS) data. Hispanics were not tracked consistently for the DMDC
data from 2001 through 2005. Hispanics represent 13 percent of the U.S.
population. However, from 2003 to 2005, the DMDC Hispanic Race data
appear to be integrated with Blacks, Mexican-American, and American
Indian, resulting in a small percentage reporting as Hispanics. Thus, the
DMDC race categories are White, Black, Asian, and Other, with Hispanics
and other low percentage race respondents reported in the Other category of
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DMDC race data. The issue of under reported numbers of Hispanics has also
raised questions with the 2010 Census (Washington, 2009).
Retention: Navy enlisted personnel who remain in the Navy for three years
after the date of enlistment. Three years were used based on the minimum
enlistment timeframe.
Return on Investment (ROI): Return on investment in the business sector is a
calculation used to determine whether a proposed investment is wise and how
well it will repay the investor. It is calculated as the ratio of the amount
gained (taken as positive) or lost (taken as negative) relative to the base. For
this study, support or contraindication for the Navy's ROI were derived from
the proposed differential research with respect to Navy accessions and
retentions of NJROTC graduates.
Socioeconomic Status: Socioeconomic status is based on the location of the
recruit's residence upon enlistment. The four categories of socioeconomic
status were derived from the 2000 Census, based on median household
income and five-numbered Zip code: Low Income - 0 up to $43,601; Medium
Low Income - $43,601 up to $53,026; Medium High Income - $53,026 up to
$66,082; and High Income - $66,082 and greater (adjusted for inflation to
2008 using the U.S. Inflation Calculator at
http://www.usinflationcalculator.com/).
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The purpose of this study was to determine whether NJROTC participation was
an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. If, as some argue, NJROTC
participation positively influences Navy accessions and retentions, then policymakers
should be aware of the costs and benefits of NJROTC relative to other Navy
recruiting programs. On the other hand, if NJROTC participation does not
significantly influence Navy accessions and retentions, then the arguments of those
seeking to reduce or eliminate NJROTC expenditures gain credence. By providing
empirical evidence of NJROTC's effect on Navy accessions and retentions, the
ongoing debate in the literature will be clarified by the provision of specific cost and
benefit information for NJROTC.
To convey an understanding of the Navy's JROTC program, the following
literature review is presented in six sections. The first section provides details on the
legislative history of the Navy's JROTC program. The second section offers
information on the NJROTC's organizational processes, structure, and curriculum.
The third section gives specifics on the cost of the NJROTC program to the naval
service and local school districts. The fourth section synthesizes the related research
on the efficacy of the NJROTC program. The fifth section offers information on the
Navy Recruiting Command (NRC). Although recruiting is not a stated goal of the
NJROTC program, an understanding of the Navy recruiting processes is necessary to
support a rationale for using NJROTC as a Navy recruit pipeline-training program.
The final section summarizes the review of this literature chapter.
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Legislative History ofNJROTC
The literature describes three main legislative events in authorizing the funding
to establish and expand the JROTC program: (a) the National Defense Act of 1916,
(b) the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964, and (c) the National Defense Act of 1993.
The National Defense Act of 1916 established the Army JROTC program
because of World War I military expansion and the need to have an available source
of future military officers. The first JROTC program provided training for Army
officers only (Hawkins, 1988). The 1916 Act's course of instruction delineated a
three-hour-per-week syllabus to be accomplished over a three-year period; upon
completion, the secondary student received a certificate of eligibility for a reserve
Army commission when the applicant reached the age of 21. With respect to the
JROTC, the provision of the Act authorized the loan of military equipment and the
assignment of active or retired Army personnel. High schools needed to maintain a
minimum enrollment of 100 students over 14 years of age in the program (National
Defense Act of 1916).
The second major legislative initiative, the ROTC Vitalization Act of 1964,
added the Navy and Air Force JROTC programs and included funding for the
expansion of the number of units from 254 to 1200 units (Reserve Officers' Training
Vitalization Act of 1964). Notably, this legislation resulted from a backlash by
parents, teachers, and members of Congress to then Secretary of State Robert S.
McNamara's initial proposal to cut military funding for the JROTC program
(Hawkins, 1988). Other significant changes to the program following this legislation
consisted of the addition of the Marine JROTC program and the inclusion of female
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cadets in the 1970s. Much of the research literature focuses on Army JROTC based
on its 50-year advantage over the other services as a JROTC organization.
The 1992 Los Angeles riots influenced President George H. W. Bush and then
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Colin Powell, to increase the number of
JROTC units, especially in inner city areas, in an effort to provide positive role
models for disadvantaged American youth. General Powell stated, "Inner city kids,
many from broken homes, found stability and role models from JROTC" (Powell,
1995, p. 541). Justification for increased funding included an expectation of
increased high school completion rates, reduced drug use, raised self-esteem, and
keeping the kids on the "right track" (Days & Ang, 2004). The National Defense
Authorization Act of 1993 authorized funding for the expansion of the existing 1600
units to 3500 units, with the focus of placing these new units in under-represented
areas, such as the northern plains, northeast and New England, and in inner cities
(Laurence & Estrada, 2003).
In recent years, JROTC has continued to be a popular program with Congress.
However, even with congressional support, JROTC continues to experience funding
shortages for instructors, material, and equipment. Further, the No Child Left Behind
Act of 2001 mandated accountability measures, such as requiring JROTC instructors
to have single- and multiple-subject teaching certificates. Financial constraints and
accountability pressures make it likely that JROTC programs will have to justify
funding to continue the program at the present cost to the military. The following
statement amplifies pressure for the military to justify their budgets:
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If history is any guide, JROTC's bright future could quickly change. Many
uniformed resource managers looking at a program's fiscal bottom line rather
than its long-term but unquantifiable effects on civil-military relations and
moral development of the Nation's youth will undoubtedly continue to view
JROTC as an expensive luxury. (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001, p. 81)
The then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jay Johnson, testified before
Congress that "even if the number is only 30 percent [JROTC cadets joining the
military], that is a good number. But think about what we get out of the other 70
percent. They have exposure to the military" (National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2001). It can be inferred from this statement by the CNO that the
general U.S. population would benefit from having an understanding of the purpose
of the military.
Military recruiters have been given equal access to high school students, as is
the case with other employers and college recruiters (No Child Left Behind Act of
2001). Military recruiters now have access to student phone numbers and addresses
and the freedom to recruit at high school campuses. As a result, there is increased
controversy over whether the military should be allowed to recruit on high school
campuses. Some in JROTC leadership have voiced their concerns on JROTC
recruiting in that it could open Pandora's Box, providing undeniable evidence to
those who have sentiments that JROTC is being used as a recruiting instrument rather
than a citizenship and leadership education program.
The NJROTC Organization and Curriculum
Under guidance provided by the Department of Defense and the Secretary of
the Navy, the Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) is responsible for
administering the NJROTC program. NSTC is located in Chicago; however, the
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department responsible for the NJROTC program is located in Pensacola, Florida.
Currently, there is a staff of 22 Area Managers and eight at headquarters, led by the
director of the program, Dr. J. D. Smith. All staff members are civil service or
government contractors (Dr. J.D. Smith, personal communication, January 13, 2009).
The administrative mission of the NSTC NJROTC staff is to direct and support
the operations and administration of the NJROTC units through a network of 11
NJROTC area managers, which are numbered Area 3 through 13 (see Figure 1).
Each area manager, usually a retired senior naval officer, and an administrative
assistant are both government contractors. The NSTC NJROTC staff also provides
oversight for evaluating the quality of the program and its budget (Lavin, n.d.). Area
managers are geographically distributed throughout the United States. Their purpose
is to provide the quality control link from the NJROTC program office in Pensacola
to the present 624 NJROTC units. The area managers interface with the NJROTC
Unit instructors to ensure that the Navy provides the host units proper support.
Further, these 11 area managers address any issues from the host school or
community in which the NJROTC Unit resides. In the summer, the area managers
direct or participate in the summer training programs for instructors and summer
academies for cadets. The area manager is also involved in unit assessment by
ensuring each unit completes its annual graduate data report via the Navy JROTC
Unit Management system. Data from 2001 to 2005 were used in this research. Each
year, the area manager ensures that a qualified examiner, normally the area manager
or a designated military representative, inspects all the units. Figure 1 depicts the 11
NJROTC geographical areas in which the 624 NJROTC units reside.
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Figure 1. The 11 NJROTC Geographic Areas
From Naval Junior Officer's Training Corps program, by U. S. Department of the
Navy, 2009, retrieved February 27, 2009, from https://www.njrotc.navy.mil/. As
noted earlier there is no Area 1 or 2. Adapted with permission of the author.
There are over 1,300 NJROTC instructors at 624 units. These instructors, who
are retired officers or enlisted personnel from the Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast
Guard, teach the NJROTC program at accredited high schools. Each school
participating in NJROTC has one lead instructor, called the Senior Naval Science
Instructor (SNSI), a retired commissioned officers of the rank W2 (Navy or USMC
Warrant Officer) through 06 (Navy Captain or USMC Colonel). Assisting the SNSI
are retired enlisted personnel from the rank of E6 (Petty Officer First Class or Staff
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Sergeant) through E9 (Master Chief or Master Gunnery Sergeant) who are called
Naval Science Instructors (NSI). Depending on the number of cadets, there will be
one or more NSIs. Though there is a separate USMC JROTC program, Marine Corps
officers and enlisted personnel can fill the Navy's JROTC SNSI or NSI positions.
The NSTC certifies instructors through a semi-annual board process. Instructors also
have to meet certain physical fitness and weight standards. Final hiring criteria and
specific qualification requirements remain with the employing school district.
Until recently, the minimum education requirement for a SNSI was a bachelor's
degree and a high school diploma or its equivalent for the NSI. However, recent
pressures of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 have forced local school districts
and the Navy to address the issue of single- and multiple-subject teaching credentials
for NJROTC teachers (No Child Left Behind Act of 2001). This added instructor
qualification presently varies state by state but is forecasted to become a permanent
requirement, causing an added burden to the hiring of the enlisted NSIs who normally
do not have a bachelor's degree. For the time being, most school districts are giving
SNSIs and NSIs a five-year grace period to complete their certification and
educational requirements (Cdr. K. Lyles, personal communication, October 14,
2005).
The NJROTC instructor salary is roughly equal to the pay the military member
received when on active duty. The host school, the naval service, and the instructor
(based on his/her retirement pay) share the cost to meet the instructor's equivalent
active duty pay (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). The minimum instructor pay is
based on the following formula: Base Pay (based on rank at retirement) plus Basic
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Allowance for Housing (BAH) for the area in which the unit is located, plus Basic
Allowance for Subsistence (BAS), plus clothing allowance (enlisted only) plus Cost
of Living Adjustments (COLA), minus Gross Retirement, which equals minimum
instructor pay (MIP). MIP is divided equally between the Navy and the host school
district. As an example, if a Commander/05 pay grade received $100,000 on active
duty, and his retirement pay was $50,000, the respective JROTC service and school
system would split the remaining cost of $50,000 and incur a cost of $25,000 each
(U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). Normally, $25,000 per year is below the
average pay for a beginning teacher, especially given that this NJROTC teacher has
over 20 years of military experience. Further, some of the SNSIs and NSIs teach
after-school sports programs, offering the school district an added leadership resource
for teaching team sports.
To be a host NJROTC Unit school, the school must be a fully-accredited
secondary education institution and must complete an application with the Naval
Service Training Command (NSTC). The main provisions of the application are to
(a) provide a three-year or four-year course of instruction in naval science; (b)
maintain unit enrollment of 100 in the program, or 10 percent of the student
population of the high school; (c) offer no less than one full credit toward graduation
for each academic year of NJROTC completion; and (d) provide classroom space,
storage space, instructor office space, an assembly area, a drill field, and clerical
assistance (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). As of February 2009, there were
198 schools on the Navy JROTC waiting list.
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A student must be enrolled in grades 9 through 12 at the school where the unit
resides to become an NJROTC cadet. Cadets must meet the school's standards for
participation in the school's physical education program. Other criteria are
acceptable standards of academic achievement, standards of conduct, and personal
grooming standards mandated by the SNSI and school. Essential to the grooming
standards is that NJROTC cadet appearance is not to reflect disgrace on the naval
service. Special NJROTC students who do not meet the qualification requirements
may be enrolled as NJROTC cadets with approval of the principal and the SNSI. Any
additional support to provide instruction to special education students must be
provided by the host school (U.S. Department of the Navy, 1996).
As of 2004, NJROTC units numbered 624 and instructed 86,069 cadets—41
percent female and 59 percent male. The minority participation is 64 percent: 34
percent Black-American, 22 percent Hispanic, four percent Asian-American/Pacific
Islander, 1 percent Native American/Alaskan Native, and three percent other. The
Naval Service Training Command states that more than 60 percent of the NJROTC
graduating cadets continue to higher education, with 40 percent entering military
service. These minority percentages, which are higher than the nationwide average,
are an indicator of the program's success in attracting cadets from diverse and
disadvantaged backgrounds (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005). Since the active
duty Navy has had difficulties meeting diversification goals (Admiral Michael
Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations, personal communication, September 22, 2005),
NJROTC should be an attractive recruiting source based on its diverse population of
cadets.
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The NSTC claims, based on mostly anecdotal evidence, that an NJROTC Unit
benefits the student as well as the community (U.S. Department of the Navy, 2005).
Cadets gain personal satisfaction from belonging to the NJROTC team. The
NJROTC offers a school the opportunity to incorporate basic elements of citizenship
and leadership into the curriculum. The units support the school with community
service projects, as well as ceremonial functions using color guard and drill teams.
NJROTC cadets also get special consideration for college ROTC scholarships and
appointments to the U.S. Naval Academy and are entitled to advanced promotion in
the military upon enlistment (CSIS, 1999). These incentives appear to be recruiting
incentives, although Navy JROTC leaders state that it is an unintended favorable
consequence to the Navy and insist that the NJROTC program is offered to train high
school students in citizenship and leadership (Cdr. Mark Watson, personal
communication, June 29, 2006).
The NJROTC curriculum covers eight major academic areas over a period of
four years. The course of instruction is designed to complete two areas of instruction
for each year (Lavin, n.d., pp. 1-6):
1. Year One: Cadet Field Manual and Introduction to the NJROTC Course
2. Year Two: Maritime History and Nautical Sciences
3. Year Three: Naval Knowledge and Naval Skills
4. Year Four: Leadership Theory and Leadership Laboratory
The program integrates classroom time, group exercises, physical fitness, and
field trips to provide a balance of different naval service learning activities. The
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majority of NJROTC units also sponsor annual pass in review, drill teams, color
guards, physical skill tests, and marksmanship contests.
The NJROTC goals of citizenship and leadership training are emphasized
throughout the four years of cadet instruction. With respect to citizenship training,
the fundamental requirements for democratic citizenship and what it means to be a
good citizen are taught in Unit III - Citizenship and IV - Foundations of Our
Government in the Introduction of the NJROTC Course during the second semester
of the cadet's freshman year. The classroom leadership training occurs in Unit II Leadership, occurring during the same course. Also, during the senior year, the two
courses entitled Leadership Theory and Leadership Lab specifically focuses on
teaching the basic principles of leadership, ethics, and morals. They also provide
leadership case studies, plus a practical portion providing these senior cadets the
opportunity to serve in positions of authority in their NJROTC Unit.
When comparing the NJROTC curriculum with Navy entrance training
curricula for officers and enlisted personnel, there are many similarities—especially
in the naval history and leadership training classes. This leads to the assumption that
there has been some foresight in using the NJROTC as a Navy accessions program. It
further lends credence to the idea of using NJROTC as a pipeline-training program
for high school students who intend to join the Navy after they graduate from high
school. This will be considered in further detail throughout this dissertation.
NJROTC Cost
In the examination of the literature, it was discovered that an accurate
accounting of the total cost of the program was lacking. This is mainly because the
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Navy and the host school report their budgets separately. Moreover, NJROTC cost
totals generally do not include indirect costs to the host school for field trips, school
space, school insurance, janitorial service, and lighting, all of which would be
difficult to quantify for 624 units.
The total cost to the Navy from fiscal year 2000 to 2007 has risen from $37 to
$58 Million supporting increases from 490 to 624 units and 69,749 to 92,685 cadets,
respectively. The average cost per cadet over the same period was between $531
(2000) and $627 (2008) in Table 1.
Table 1
NAVY JUNIOR RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS BUDGET
FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004 FY2005 FY2006 FY2007
O&M Resources (000) 1/
Uniforms & Subsistence (RPA) (000)
Service Totals: (000)
Avg. Cadet Enrollments

25,913 28,183 32,283 37,394 39,798 39,743 42,875 44,595
11,089 13,945 12,207 13,937 12,388 12,763
$37,002

13,094

13,476

42,128 44,490 51,331 52,186 52,506 55,969 58,071

69,749 74,513 77,958 84,613 86,069 88,894 90,425 92,685

Investment per Cadet

531

565

571

607

606

591

619

627

Units (World-wide)

490

562

582

623

624

624

624

624

1/ O&M funding for instructor salaries (approx. 85%), textbooks, travel, educational materials, and
miscellaneous expenses.
Source, FY2006 President's Budget

For FY 2008, not listed in Table 1, the Navy JROTC $62 million budget as
reported from the NJROTC headquarters staff was derived from two funding lines:
Operational and Maintenance Navy (OMN) and Reserve Program Navy (RPN). The
OMN budget for NJROTC, $48 million, provided funding for instructor salaries,
textbooks, travel, and educational materials. The RPN budget for NJROTC, $14
million, provided funding for uniform items. The school districts paid an estimated
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$50 million in instructor pay (not included are benefits, FICA, and indirect costs for
schools to provide working spaces on school grounds). Coupling instructor retirement
pay, an estimated $100 million, brings the total cost of NJROTC to $212 million.
(Teresa Casey, NJROTC Headquarters Staff, personal communication, 27 February
2009).
Since 2000, the NJROTC program has had a 27 percent increase in units.
Although there is support for continued expansion of the Navy program, funding of
the NJROTC program has not met with commensurate support from certain elements
in the Navy itself. The main reason is that some believe NJROTC is a luxury item
and that there are military items of greater importance to fund, especially during the
present Global War on Terrorism (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001).
If empirical evidence were obtained that NJROTC positively influences
NJROTC cadets to pursue a career and remain in the Navy, then program managers
can give added evidence for the continued funding of the program. As stated
previously, this evidence could also support other cost-saving endeavors, such as
using NJROTC as a pipeline-training program to decrease time to train for Navy
officers and enlisted personnel or using NJROTC as a relatively cheaper recruiting
tool.
NJROTC Related Research
Most of the documentation on the NJROTC program is derived from
government documents. Limited peer-reviewed literature exists focusing specifically
on the Navy, which is why the majority of the related research is derived from studies
on the other service JROTC programs. This section is divided into two parts. The
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first part is a synthesis of peer-reviewed literature on stakeholder perceptions of the
JROTC program and JROTC outcome evaluation studies. To counter the abundance
of JROTC-based research supporting the program, information is included from the
opponents of JROTC. The second part examines JROTC's influence on military
accession, retention, and attrition.
Studies on the Perceptions and Outcomes of JROTC
The JROTC research can be categorized according to two general areas: (a)
studies that assess perceptions about the program and (b) assessments on achieving
the curriculum objectives. Surveys were the primary research instruments used to
obtain the data. The questions were typically formed to collect factual and attitudinal
data. Following an analysis of the data, the authors used descriptive and inferential
statistics to report the findings.
Two examples of typical scholarly studies on perception of the JROTC program
were a school counselor's perception of JROTC (Perruse, 1997) and the principal's
attitude about JROTC instructors (Logan, 2000). Other stakeholder study participants
were cadets, parents, and community members. These studies, and others (Hicks,
2000; Marks, 2004; Morris, 2003), reported positive stakeholder perceptions of
JROTC. They also provided encouraging anecdotal claims by the participants. Of
note, these researchers tended to support the JROTC program, which could create the
impression of bias in the findings, especially with respect to the anecdotal claims.
The largest study of NJROTC perception, Benefits Analysis of the Naval Junior
Reserve Officers Training Corps, was conducted by the Navy in 1992 (Bailey, et al.,
1992). This study, though 14 years old, was the last large NJROTC research effort
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conducted by the Navy. The purpose of the study was to conduct an evaluation of the
NJROTC for the Navy and the secondary school system. Survey instruments were
developed targeting the perceptions of the NJROTC instructors, school
administrators, members of the community, and students. A representative sample of
38 units out of the population of 228 units was selected to participate in the study,
with 5,521 cadets participating, which at that time were 18.78 percent of the total
NJROTC cadet population. The findings from this study reported the overall
perceptions of the NJROTC program as providing positive benefits to the students
and community. Following this study, the Navy began collecting annual data on
NJROTC cadet postgraduate intentions, which as stated previously, are examined in
this study.
Another large sample perception study of JROTC units was sponsored by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS, 1999). The intention of the
CSIS study, JROTC: Contributions to America's Communities, was to conduct
JROTC field research in medium-sized urban environments. The investigators
gathered a variety of field research data from three school systems: (a) Chicago, (b)
Washington, D.C., and (c) El Paso. These cities represented the type of urban
environment targeted for JROTC expansion in the 1990s in order to assist
disadvantaged urban youth. The findings of the study, which included NJROTC
units, claimed that JROTC is beneficial to communities and should be expanded with
the necessary resources (CSIS, 1999). The benefit of the CSIS report was the
background information provided about the four JROTC programs. However, as in
most JROTC research, the study was descriptive in nature with primarily anecdotal
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evidence to support its findings. Further, the study lacked balance when compared
with the reported CSIS research on the three cities. The findings of the Chicago
research were far more in depth than the findings for Washington, D.C., and El Paso.
In addition, this study did not identify which service JROTC units were selected for
the field research. Overall, the CSIS study is problematic for those seeking
quantitative evidence on the benefit of JROTC. Also, the report does not offer
findings that address specific service JROTC program.
The JROTC academic outcome-related studies focused on measuring the
program's effect on teaching citizenship and leadership (Bulach, 2002; Hawkins,
1988; Roberts, 1991). One such series of studies sought to compare JROTC and nonJROTC students based on two psychometric tests designed to measure citizenship.
The two test measures, the DEMO and the SELF test, attempted to determine the
participants' level of "democratic maturity" and "cognitive dissonance" (Demoulin &
Ritter, 2000, p. 410). The DEMO test, designed to measure democratic maturity, was
based on John Dewey's definition of democracy: "The interdependence of
independent individuals" (Demoulin & Ritter, 2000, p. 410). The test itself was
designed to measure factors that are needed to live successfully in a democracy. The
SELF test measures cognitive dissonance: "Cognitive dissonance is described as a
hurt caused by personal needs not being gratified" (Demoulin & Ritter, 2000, p. 410).
The questionnaires that were included in the DEMO and SELF tests were
administered to Army and Air Force JROTC cadets and to other organized groups—
college students, high school students, and other groups (Cassel & Ritter, 1999;
Cassel & Standifer; 2000a, b; Demoulin & Ritter, 2000; Kilted et al., 1999; Kolstad &
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Ritter, 2000; Reiger & Demoulin, 2000; Schmidt, 2001, 2003a, & 2003b). The study
made use of multiple regression analysis techniques, and it reported that "JROTC
programs provide critical skills in relation to democratic maturity that are deemed
essential for success in a democracy" (Demoulin & Ritter, 2000, p. 411).
Except for the 1992 Navy sponsored study and the 1999 CSIS Study, the major
limitation of the JROTC perception studies and the academic outcome-related studies
was sample size. Predominantly, these studies focused on just one or on small
numbers of JROTC units. In addition, recent studies on NJROTC are virtually
nonexistent.
With regard to dissertations or peer-reviewed articles from those who oppose
JROTC on high school campuses, only two articles in the peer-reviewed literature
were found: Berlowitz (2000) and Ayers (2006). Both articles provide facts and
justification for the removal of JROTC from high school campuses. The main claim
of both is that JROTC is a military recruiting vehicle and that high school students
should not be exposed to it. Also elaborated is the fact that the military discriminates
against females and homosexuals and that the military should not be allowed access
to students or student information because the military is not an equal opportunity
employer. Both articles lack the balance that might be expected of scholarly journals,
particularly the Ayers article, which was printed in Phi Delta Kappan. However, as
suggested previously, the studies or articles supporting the JROTC program may lack
balance as well, supporting the argument that it is difficult for writers to put their
agendas aside.
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There are also organizations with anti-JROTC Web sites that provide opposing
viewpoints about the JROTC program; most of these viewpoints are also anecdotal in
nature. Morris (2003) in her dissertation on the JROTC program lists the following
organizations that take an opposing view of the establishment of JROTC programs in
secondary education systems:
1. American Friends Service Committee (AFSC)
2. Central Committee for Conscientious Objection (CCCO)
3. Center for Defense Information (CDI)
4. Women Against Military Madness (WAMM)
5. Veterans for Peace (VP)
6. Committee Opposed to Militarism and the Draft (COMD)
7. War Registers League
8. Gay and Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation (GLADD)
9. Project on Youth and Non-Military Opportunities (Project YANO)
The main argument against JROTC is that it is being used as a tool by the
military to increase access from the pool of future enlistees. Other arguments against
JROTC include the following from the Central Committee for Conscientious
Objectors (CCCO, 2005):
1. The secondary education system is no place for an institution that prevents
critical thinking of students in gun-free schools.
2. JROTC costs school districts tens of thousands of dollars.
3. The program violates the principle of local control.
4. JROTC provides limited oversight of the curriculum or instructors.
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5. Textbooks are biased, racist, and bigoted.
6. JROTC promotes guns and warfare, which promote gangs and gang
violence.
In recent years, JROTC programs have come under pressure to prohibit schools
from including JROTC classes. A controversial decision in 2006 by the San Francisco
Board of Education attempted to ban JROTC based on the military's discriminatory
stance on gays in the military (Mattimore, 2006 & Maxwell, 2006). In November
2008, proponents of JROTC gathered enough signatures to put the measure to
continue JROTC on the ballot. The non-binding measure, Proposition V, passed with
53 percent of the vote (Johnson, 2008). Additionally, California and other states are
considering removing physical education credit for JROTC, which would take away a
graduation requirement credit incentive for taking JROTC (Cdr. Vizcarra, personal
communication, February 27, 2009).
Other opponents of JROTC, including some military program managers, have
shown the sentiment that the military should not fund a citizenship education program
with scarce resources. Most military program managers are continuously being asked
to cut any items that do not have a direct effect on the current war on terrorism. The
JROTC program currently has congressional backing, but with the continuous
demands to use the military as a "911 emergency response" force throughout the
world, changes in budget priorities are likely to occur (Corbett & Coumbe, 2001).
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JROTC's Influence on Military Accession, Retention, and Attrition
Studying the impact NJROTC has had on military accessions and retentions is a
departure from the preponderance of JROTC studies, which generally reported
findings on academic or social benefits. In fact, only four studies from the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPS) provide an empirical examination of JROTC participation
on enlistment and retention. The Accession Policy Directorate in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) for Personnel Readiness sponsored the first
study, A Comprehensive Study of the Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Program
(Laurence & Estrada, 2003). The second study, An Empirical Examination of the
Impact of JROTC Participation on Enlistment, Retention, and Attrition, followed up
on the results of the first study and was a research project by two attending students
(Days & Ang, 2004). The third NPS-sponsored study, Naval Junior Officers'
Training Corps: A Comparison with Other Successful Youth Development Programs
and an Analysis of Military Recruits Who Participate in JROTC (Walls, 2003). The
fourth is Analysis of Junior Reserve Officer Training Corps Participation and its
Effects on First Term Attrition, Promotion, and Reenlistment (Hentz & Packwood,
2007)
In the first study, the Naval Postgraduate School of Business and Public Policy
was commissioned to review JROTC curricular materials, budgeting issues, and
recruitment. The results of this research provided several findings of interest relating
to military enlistment and retention. Based on descriptive analysis techniques using
Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) data from 1990-2001, researchers at NPS
determined that the Army had the greatest number of recruits who participated in
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JROTC, followed by the Marine Corps, the Navy, and the Air Force. The study also
confirmed that JROTC participants left the military during their first-term enlistment
at a lower rate than their non-JROTC peers did. First-term attrition, defined by
military personnel who fail to complete their first term of enlistment, was lowest for
minority JROTC participants.
Though the NPS study by Laurence and Estrada (2003) provided unique
empirical evidence that JROTC participation has a positive influence on enlistment
and attrition, there exist several limitations. The researcher cautions that the number
of recruits with JROTC participation is relatively small compared to the non-JROTC
recruits, reflecting an imbalance in the comparison groups. The study also reported
data only on enlisted personnel. In addition, the data were not sorted by the recruits'
respective service JROTC program. Since the data set stops in 2001, these numbers
may have changed, especially given the events that have occurred since September
11, 2001. Nonetheless, this study confirms the DMDC as a good source of data for
future empirical analyses of the return on investment for the NJROTC program.
The second study, An Empirical Examination of the Impact of JROTC
Participation on Enlistment, Retention, and Attrition, by Days and Ang (2004), used
two databases: the 1980 High School and Beyond (HS&B) Survey data and DMDC
data. The High School and Beyond data were collected on two cohorts of
sophomores and seniors, commencing in 1980, with follow-up surveys in 1982, 1984,
1986, and 1992 (for the original sophomores only). The study contained a national
stratified sample from 1,222 schools in which 36 sophomores and 36 seniors were
randomly selected for a total of 14,825 sophomores and 11,955 seniors. The
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information focused on high school programs, family background, goals, values, posthigh school plans, and post-high school employment.
Using multiple regression analysis techniques from the HS&B cohort data, the
researchers found that JROTC participation increased the probability of enlisting in
the military. However, when they changed their model to account for students who
may have had the inclination to join the military before participating in JROTC, there
was no correlation between JROTC participation and enlistment. The method used to
measure previous inclination (i.e., self-selection) was a two-stage least squares and
bivariate probit equation. The latency of the data complicated the findings from the
HS&B survey even further. Even if the initial analyses were accurate, it would only
hold true for this 1980 cohort and may not be applicable to JROTC graduates of the
21 st century. Additionally, the database had only a category of JROTC and did not
have sub-categories for NJROTC.
Days and Ang (2004) also obtained Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps
enlisted cohort data from the DMDC. The data obtained for this study focused on
enlisted personnel who entered the service from 1980 to 2000. The extraction of
these data sets was the precursor of their empirical analysis of JROTC on military
enlistment, reenlistment, and attrition. The distributions included military enlistment
by JROTC participants, recruits with JROTC participation by service, recruits with
JROTC by gender, recruits with JROTC by race, and recruits with JROTC by Armed
Forces Qualification Test (AFQT). The AFQT test is also known as the Armed
Service Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and is used by the military to assess a
recruit's job qualifications.
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Using regression analysis, researchers found that JROTC participation had a
positive influence on reenlistments. Further, JROTC graduates tended to stay longer
in the military than their non-JROTC counterparts did. Not included in the study
were unemployment rates, which could have been the overriding factor for JROTC
cadets to enlist and/or remain in the Navy. Finally, the DMDC data can be sorted by
the respective service JROTC program, which is the focus of this research. The
NJROTC information is tracked under the category of "Youth Program."
The third NPS-sponsored study by Walls (2003), NavalJunior Officers'
Training Corps: A Comparison With Other Successful Youth Development Programs
and an Analysis of Military Recruits Who Participate in JROTC, compared JROTC
with other successful youth programs, such as Boys and Girls Clubs, Scouts, YMCA,
YWCA, 4-H, Camp Fire, religious youth programs, sports programs, and others.
Walls also analyzed pre-existing DMDC data from 1990 to 2001 to compare military
enlisted accessions between those who participated in youth programs and those who
did not. The main finding of this study was that JROTC is similar to other youth
programs in having a positive effect on youth development. The study also claimed
that no other single high school youth program could match JROTC in its size, level
of funding, and scope of accomplishments (Walls, 2003).
The final NPS study (Hentz & Packwood, 2007) investigated whether JROTC
participation significantly impacts first term attrition, promotion, reenlistment, time to
attrition, and time to promotion using DMDC data from 1994-2000. The results
indicated that JROTC had a statistically positive association with promotion,
reenlistment and time to attrition. The present study added to the Hentz and
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Packwood research by using DMDC data from 2001 to 2006; moreover, this current
research study was specifically focused on the Navy JROTC program rather than all
the service programs.
Similar to the research of this present study, these four studies, cited in this
section, used pre-existing DMDC data, though the data were limited to 2001 or prior.
The latency of the data, plus the fact that these studies do not provide detailed
information on the NJROTC program, adds greater relevancy to research on the Navy
JROTC program.
The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC)
The rationale to consider using NJROTC as a recruitment tool for the Navy is
timely, especially considering the growing evidence that the other services, primarily
the Army and Marine Corps, are increasing their recruiting efforts at high schools
with JROTC units (Department of the Army, 1999; Dr. William McHenry, personal
communication, June 20, 2005). The Navy Recruiting Command (NRC), located in
Millington, Tennessee, is responsible for recruiting men and women into the active
duty and Naval Reserve enlisted force. The NRC also recruits officers for Officer
Candidate School and processes applications for Naval Reserve Officer Training
Corps (NROTC). Officer applications for the Naval Academy are not processed by
the NRC; these are done by the Naval Academy itself. The NRC manages over 1600
recruiting installations with almost 8,000 personnel and budgets of nearly $1.2 billion
annually. The recruiting advertising budget for 2006 was over $100 million (Cdr.
Glen Kaemmerer, personal communication, November 7, 2005). The Navy has met
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its recruiting goals for the past 25 years. For the past 10 years, it has recruited an
average of 50,000 enlisted personnel and 3000 officers per year.
Although the Navy has achieved its recruiting goals for some time, it has not
always received the highest quality of recruit or met its diversification goals. The
Navy Recruiting Command measures qualification for potential military jobs of the
recruit by using the AFQT test. Since 2003, the Navy has raised the bar slightly by
increasing the percentage of Test Score Category I-IIIA recruits (those scoring above
50 on the AFQT of the ASVAB) from 65 percent in FY03 to 67 percent in FY04. In
addition, JROTC cadets receiving advance pay grade status in the Navy have
increased (2003 = 380, 2004 = 404, 2005 = 645). Between 2003 and 2005, the Navy
also improved the number of recruits with high school diplomas slightly and raised
the percentage of new recruits with college experience (12 or more college semester
units). Not to detract from these positive performance metrics, but these results may
have a connection to the Navy's recent attraction as a military service—especially
since the Army and Marine Corps are doing the preponderance of the heavy fighting
in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Proving that NJROTC participation can provide savings for the recruiting
budget or provide access to improve the quality and diversification of Navy
accessions is of considerable interest to the Navy. The Chief of Naval Operations
recently stated he is looking for new ways to recruit minorities, especially Black
Americans. Currently, the percentage of Blacks in the Navy officer corps is seven
percent, which is well below the national population average and that of DOD. In an
email to the Navy senior leadership, the then Chief of Naval Operations stated:
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I am interested in truly thinking about diversity in new ways and breaking some
china. I want to achieve measurable, permanent effects, so that—even through
somebody's benign neglect in the future—what we do cannot be undone.. .The
diversity of our Navy matters—a very great deal. I know you share my desire
to make a difference and thank you in advance for your continued support.
(Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Michael Mullen, personal communication,
September 22, 2005)
Summary
Given the forecast of austere military budgets to fund the Global War on
Terror, the findings of this research should be of considerable interest to Navy
JROTC officials and recruiters as they justify their programs' budgets. The reviewed
literature on the JROTC program revealed positive information concerning the
influence that JROTC has had on the nation's youth for the past 80 years. The
legislative history pointed to three pieces of legislation supporting the expansion of
the program; specific to the Navy JROTC program was the ROTC Vitalization Act of
1964, which added the Navy and Air Force JROTC programs. Pertinent background
facts were provided in this literature review on the organization, curriculum, and cost,
followed by a synthesis of the related research. Notably, only four studies in the
literature, all from the Naval Post-Graduate School, offer insight on JROTC
participation as an explanatory variable supporting the program's direct return on
investment to the military. The findings from these studies offer some empirical
evidence on JROTC participation having a positive influence on military enlisted
accessions and retention. Additionally, these studies confirmed that there has not
been a comprehensive study on Navy's JROTC's influence on military accessions,
retentions, and attrition. Last, background information on the Navy Recruiting
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Command was offered to support or refute those that believe NJROTC should be
considered as a pipeline-training program.

40

CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
The scope of this dissertation was limited to empirical analysis of the Navy's
JROTC program with a primary focus on the impact NJROTC participation has on
Navy accessions and retentions. This study has increasing significance because since
September 11, 2001, the Navy has directed all Navy program managers to justify
their programs based on priorities to support the war on terrorism. Funding a
citizenship-training program, which the NJROTC program emphasizes in its mission
statement, did not make the official list of Navy priorities (U.S. Department of the
Navy, 2004). On the other hand, recruiting a quality force representing the diversity
of America did make the list. Thus, having insight into the intentions of NJROTC
graduates and comparing demographics between NJROTC and non-NJROTC Navy
accessions is of interest with respect to Navy recruiting. Also of significance is
determining whether NJROTC accessions stay in the Navy at a higher rate than do
non-NJROTC accessions. The study also provides NJROTC program managers a
unique insight into the NJROTC descriptive and inferential data, which may provide
increased awareness on the efficacy of the NJROTC program. There are currently
700 secondary schools on the waiting list for JROTC, with Navy having 198 on the
waiting list (Barbassa, 2008; Teresa Casey, NJROTC Headquarters Staff, personal
communication, February 27, 2009). Given this, the research reported in this
dissertation may also be of benefit to Navy decision-makers in deciding which
NJROTC area or region to add or remove units.
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In this chapter, there are five main sections: one, which describes the data and
how it was collected; two, which describes the data analysis plan based on the
research questions and hypotheses; three and four, which address selection bias and
limitations of the proposed research; and finally, a summary of this methodology
section.
Data Collection
There is no single tracking system of what happens to NJROTC cadets after
high school graduation. The Department of Defense is on record for not tracking how
many cadets enlist in the military (Barbassa, 2007). The reason is based on Privacy
Act concerns to protect high school students. The Navy does do an exit survey for
their NJROTC graduates but does not track whether these cadets actually join the
Navy. The two databases consulted for this study, as noted above, were the Navy's
JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) database, from which the career intent of
NJROTC graduates are maintained, and the Defense Manpower Data Center
(DMDC), which provides data on all Navy enlisted accessions including NJROTC
participants. Both the JUMS and DMDC databases used in this study contained the
population data of NJROTC graduates and Navy accessions from 2001 to 2005.
The JUMS database includes variables that record NJROTC graduate career
intent data (Appendix A). NJROTC program managers in Pensacola, Florida,
maintain the database, and permission to use it is required. Each NJROTC Unit at a
school collects career intent data annually on graduating seniors and records it into
the JUMS database, which also provides the Navy Training Service Command
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(NTSC) with up-to-date information on student enrollment demographics and
financial accounting of the unit expenses.
The JUMS data have been recorded since 1994. The five years obtained for
this study ranged from calendar year 2001 to 2005. The relevant JUMS data for this
study are included in Table 2, which shows the career intentions of graduating
NJROTC cadets.
Table 2
NJROTC Graduate Career Intent 2001 - 2005
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

7571

7385

7963

8157

8669

4 YR COLLEGE

2174

2393

2710

2919

3164

JUNIOR COLLEGE
TRADE &
VOCATIONAL

1228

1173

1257

1382

1345

342

312

301

354

409

3744

3878

4268

4655

4918

1089

1066

1145

1146

1235

NJROTC GRADUATES

TOTAL COLLEGE
MILITARY ACTIVE &
RESERVE
NAVY
ARMY

871

761

694

878

1040

AIR FORCE

427

385

326

102

116

MARINE CORPS

636

577

626

606

663

34

33

39

47

46

3057

2822

2830

2779

3100

EMPLOYMENT ONLY

461

495

612

621

592

UNDECIDED & OTHER

496

419

427

381

365

CG/MM
TOTAL MILITARY

Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001-2005.
From JROTC Unit Management System Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006.
Approximately two percent of NJROTC graduates pursue both reserve/guard
and post secondary education pursuits.
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Table 3 provides a description of the variables after the initial coding of the
variables. These variables were the primary demographic variables that were
analyzed on the NJROTC graduating cadets.
Table 3
Navy JUMS Variable Description
Variables

Definition

School Year
Unit Identification Code

2001 through 2005
5 numeric digit code given to each NJROTC unit

Race

0 = White, 1 = Black, 2 = Hispanic, 3 = Asian, 4 = other

Gender

0 = Male, 1 = Female

Education

0 = 4 Year College, 1 = 2 Year College, 3 = Junior College, 4 =
Technical or Vocational School
0 = Academy, 1 = ROTC Scholarship, 2 = ROTC Non Scholarship, 3 =

Military Program

Boost, 4 = Enlisted
0 = Navy, 1 = Army, 2 = Air Force, 3 = Marine Corps, 4 = Coast

Military Service Branch

Guard/Merchant Marines

Other
NJROTC Geographic Area

0 = Employment Only, 1 - Undecided, 2 = Other

Area 3 through 13 defined by its respective number
5 Digit Zip Code based on location of NJROTC unit
Zip Code
Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005.
From JROTC Unit Management System Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006.
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The Navy enlisted accessions data are derived from pre-existing data collected
from DMDC (Monterey, California), and it is used with their permission. The
DMDC enlisted data are divided into cohort files of those who entered the Navy in a
given fiscal year. Scrambling the social security numbers of the cases assured subject
anonymity. The five cohorts obtained for this study ranged from fiscal year (FY)
2001 to 2005 and are shown in Table 4. A fiscal year for the military runs from
October through September.
Table 4
Number and percentage of NJROTC and non NJROTC Navy Accessions for 2001 to 2005
2001

2002

2003

365
1%

350
1%

306
1%

50156

43826

39297

0.77%
38333

99%

99%

99%

99%

99%

50521
44176
39603
Total
38631
Note. Distribution of naval accessions by race for 2001- 2005. From Defense
Management Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

38145

NJROTC
Non NJROTC

2004

2004

298

455
1%
37690

The primary variable of interest for this research is NJROTC graduates who
were identified in the cohort files under a variable entitled "Youth Program."
Additional military "Youth Program" variables in this category were the other service
JROTC programs, Cadet Air Patrol, Sea Cadets, and the Reserve Officer Training
Corps, none of which were considered in this research. A complete list of the
variables selected for this research from the DMDC can be found in Table 5. This
table provides a description of the variable categories.

Table 5
DM DC variable description
Variable

Definition

RETAIN {Limited to Navy accession for
FY 2001 - 2003)

0 if the Navy accession was separated within three years of enlistment
, 1 if accession completed at least the first three years of enlistment
0 if the Navy accession was a Non NJROTC accession, l f o r NJROTC
NJROTC (variable transformed from the accession who participated in JROTC for three or four years of high
Youth Program Code variable)
school
Gender

0 if the Navy accession was a Male, 1 if the accession was a Female

Youth Program Code
RACE
Socioeconomic Status (variable based
on Median Income transformed from
2000 Census data merged with Zip
code)
REGION (variable based on zip code of
NJROTC unit)

Mental Group based on AFQT Score
Accession Year

"Youth Program" variables in this category were the JROTC programs,
Cadet Air Patrol, Sea Cadets, and the Reserve Officer Training Corps.
0 if the Navy accession's race was White, 1 if race was Black, 2 if the
race was Asian, 3 if the race was Other
0 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Hi
Income Group, 1 If from Lo Income group, 2 if from Medium Lo
income group, 3 if from Medium Hi income group
"W" it the Navy accession's region was from West, "SW" if from the
Southwest, "MW" if from the Midwest, "SE" if from Southeast, "NE" if
from the Northeast, "O" if from other.
" 1 " it the Navy accession's AFQI category was 1, "l" it AFQT category
was 2, "3A" if AFQT category was 3A, "3B" if AFQT category was 3B, 4
if AFQT category was 4, 5 if AFQT category was 5, "UNK" if AFQT
category was unknown.
Defined based on accession year from 2001 to 2005

Separation Code

Defined by numerous Separation codes.

Zip Code

5 Digit Zip Code based on home of record of Navy accession.

Note. Distribution of naval accessions by race for 2001- 2005. From Defense
Management Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

The first step in preparing the demographic information (the data cleaning
process) was to transfer the data into Statistical Processes for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) so that the exploration process could begin. The difficulty of cleaning and
organizing five years of data, 2001 to 2005, contained in 10 large data sets was
greater than was initially expected. The JUMS data had over 8000 records with 12
variables and DMDC had approximately 50,000 records with 11 variables. Missing
data were to be expected in large data sets; however, for both the DMDC and JUMS
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data bases, missing data was not a real problem in that missing data for most variables
received were labeled as unknown, or in the case of one variable, socioeconomic
status, the missing data was removed. The socioeconomic status variable was created
during the research when Zip code data were transformed into the socioeconomic
status variable using median income data from the 2000 Census. Eliminating 2,239
thousand records out of 134,300 for socioeconomic status provided the research with
98.3 percent sample of the population data for socioeconomic status. The missing
socioeconomic status data were removed during the logistic regression modeling. To
account for the impact of the missing socioeconomic status data on the other predictor
variables, a means test was conducted between the population and sample data,
resulting in no significant difference between the considered variables for the
population and sample databases. The means test conducted is further elaborated in
the Results chapter with a detailed analysis offered in Appendix C. Notwithstanding,
several other challenges presented themselves transforming variables into information
suitable to provide insight into the research questions.
DMDC data information on Hispanics beyond 2002 was not consistent with
the 2000 and 2001 DMDC datasets. For 2003-2005, the DMDC data set had problems
that made it virtually impossible to classify an independent response for the Hispanic
category. Thus, the Hispanics category for the Race variable is not used; instead, the
following race categories were used: White, Black, Asian, and Other.
To answer the research questions, the following variables had to be
transformed using SPSS:
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•

JUMS intent to join active service branch and reserve branch were merged to
create a single integrated service branch variable to highlight which service
benefited most, active or reserve, from NJROTC graduates.

•

JUMS intent to pursue education only and education with employment were
merged to create a single integrated education variable to emphasize the
amount of NJROTC cadets pursuing post-secondary education goals.

•

For JUMS data, Zip code corresponding to NJROTC Unit Identification Code
(UIC) was added as a variable, which was necessary to provide
socioeconomic status on the NJROTC cadets.

•

Using 2000 Census income data, the Zip code data for NJROTC graduating
cadets and Navy accessions were transformed into a socioeconomic status
variable for both DMDC and JUMs data.

•

DMDC Youth Program Code - This variable contains several youth program
categories. A new variable was created to isolate NJROTC and non-NJROTC
accessions allowing various demographic data to be compared.

•

DMDC separation program designation (SPD) codes were regrouped to
isolate categories of adverse attrition, non-adverse, unknown, and nonseparated for the accessions first three years of their enlistment. Additionally,
to create a dichotomous variable for the binary logistic regression model, a
variable of separated and not separated was created.

•

To compare the NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by location, a new
variable was created from Zip code data based on U.S. region. The five U.S.
Regions were West, Southwest, Midwest, Southeast, and Northeast.
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Research Questions/Hypotheses Data Analysis Plan
There are four research questions and three hypotheses to guide this
dissertation.
Research Question 1: What are the NJROTC graduates' post high school
career intentions by race, gender, location, and socioeconomic status?
The data were summarized using the following pertinent demographic
variables: location of NJROTC Unit, gender, race, and career intent following
graduation. The variables for career intent were enlisted, officer training programs,
branch of service, employment, college, trade/vocational, and other. New variables
for socioeconomic status and region were created using the NJROTC Unit location.
All data were nominal. Cross-tabulation procedures using the computer program
Statistical Program for the Social Sciences (SPSS) were used to describe the
NJROTC post graduation intentions for the demographic factors cited in the research
question.
Research Question 2: Are there significant differences between NJROTC
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted accessions (DMDC
data) by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status?
Data were summarized using the following pertinent demographic variables:
date and location of Navy enlistment, Navy JROTC, gender, race, and mental aptitude
defined by their Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) score. The location of
Navy enlistment was based on the recruits' five-numbered Zip code and provided
information on the recruits' socioeconomic status when matched with Zip code 2000
Census Data. The Zip code data were also used to create the U.S. region variable. All
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data were nominal except the AFQT score, which is ordinal. Cross-tabulation
procedures using SPSS were used to compare the differences of the groups cited in
the research question.
The hypothesis this research question attempted to support or refute was:
Hypothesis 1: Among Navy enlisted accessions, there is no significant difference
between those who participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC students.
Research Question 3: Are there significant differences between NJROTC
participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted by race, gender, AFQT
score, location, and socioeconomic status?
Descriptive and inferential statistics were used in an attempt to answer this
question. The variable of importance in determining whether there is any discernible
benefit for the Navy based on retention was the subject's accession and separation
date. The retention variable was based on the military definition of first-term
enlistment, which for the vast majority of Navy recruits lasts three years. The three
years assessed were Navy accessions from 2001 - 2003. The reason that later years
were not assessed was that the study needed to follow Navy accessions for a three
year period. Since, the data from DMDC were received in 2007, which tracked Navy
accessions up until 2006, the 2003 cohort was the last group of Navy accessions used
for research question three. The two main groups for the research were Navy
accessions who participated in NJROTC and the non-NJROTC Navy accessions.
Also assessed, using logistic regression, were the interaction effects of race, gender,
AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status variables.
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Using coded DMDC data, a regression model was created to determine whether
any inferences could be drawn on the impact NJROTC participation has on enlisted
retention. The dependent variable for this model was based on the binary response
for those who continue to remain in the military after the time period specified as first
enlistment and those who leave the military during this same timeframe. Since this
dependent variable was a binary response, logistic regression techniques were
suitable to determine whether there were significant differences among the primary
independent variable, NJROTC participation, as well as possible interaction effects of
other variables such as race, gender, location of enlistment (U.S. Region),
socioeconomic status (based on Zip Code and Census data), and AFQT score
Many social science researchers conduct studies that have dependent variables
of dichotomous nature. In fact, the use of logistic regression has expanded so much
that it could soon take over from multiple regression as the research tool of choice.
Logistic regression is different from ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in that
homogeneity of variance (does not assume homoscedasticity) and normality of errors
are not assumed. In fact, there are three main assumptions required for logistic
regression (Meyers, 222, 2006):
There must be an absence of perfect multicollinearity.
There must be no specification errors (i.e., all relevant predictors are
included and irrelevant predictors are excluded).
The independent variables must be measured at the summative response
scale, interval, or ratio level (although dichotomous variables are also
allowed).

51

The variables and their respective coding for the initial a priori model were
previously shown in Table 4. The coding of the variables is essential for properly
understanding the results of SPSS model runs. In fact, SPSS will automatically recode
the variables if they are not coded properly, which can result in significant confusion
for researchers. In SPSS, for both the dependent and independent variable, the
comparison group should be coded one for a dichotomous variable or one or greater
for categorical variables while the referent or control group (sometimes referred to as
the omitted variable) should be coded with zero. Another approach is to create a
dummy dichotomous variable for each category of the categorical variables. Either
method, with properly coded variables, will yield the same results.
There are two reasons why ordinary least squares are not appropriate when the
dependent variable is dichotomous (Meyers, 2006). (1) The equal variance
assumption is violated (the assumption of homoscedasticity) and (2) that using least
squares can produce values greater than one or less than zero. This evidenced in
Figure 2 where the shape of the best fit line for logistic regression is an S-shaped line
versus the straight line of a linear function (Meyers, 2006).
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Y=1

Linear Probability Model

Logistic Regression Model
Y=0
1 2 ^ ' 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

Figure 2: Comparing the Linear Probability and Logistic Regression Models (Meyers,
p. 225, 2006)
In conducting the analysis, it is important to know that data are transformed
using the natural log (In), which is what bends the data to fit the S shaped curve. The
main goal of logistic regression is to predict a case's membership in the comparison
group signified by the likelihood or probability of an event occurring based on a
given value for the predictor variable. As cited from Meyers (2006), there are two
mathematical steps used in a formal explanation of the model: Step 1, forming the
logistic regression equation (1) transforms the probability of an event occurring to the
natural log (In) of the odds that a case belongs to the response group.
In [odds] = a + biXi + b2X2 + • • • + b„X„

(1)

Substituted into the left side of the equation is the natural log, which in OLS is the
predicted dependent variable. "The b coefficients indicate the change in log odds of
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membership for any 1-unit change in the independent variables" (Meyers, p, 227,
2006). Hence, logistic regression is just OLS using the logit as the outcome variable.
To provide clarity, Meyers (2006) translates the outcome variable by symbolizing
predicted group membership as gpred (la):
gpred = In [odds] = a + biXi

(la)

To see how this works consider the following example: Meyers (2006) lets the
outcome variable be seeking psychiatric therapy or not and then lets Xi be a
dichotomous variable for gender - coded with one for males and zero for females.
Following a logistic regression run, the results yielded -1.099 for the constant "a"
and 1.792 for the coefficient, "b". This linear formula results in the probability of
females seeking therapy is .693 (lb) and males seeking therapy is .250 (lc).
gPred= -1-099 + 1.792(1) = 0.693

(lb)

gpred = -1.099 + 1.792(0) = 0.250

(lc)

Step 2, Computing the logit outcome: This is accomplished by inserting gpred into
equation (2), known as the antilog function (e - 2.7182), to transform the log odds
into probabilities resulting in a .667 probability that females will seek therapy (2a)
and a .250 probability that males will seek therapy (2b):
egpred / { l +

e gpre d) = p r e d i c t e d

probability

(2)

2.718693/(1 + 2.718693) = .667

(2a)

2.718~1099 /(l + 2.718"L099) = .250

(2b)

Calculating the odds ratio between the comparison group and the reference
group is one of the primary objectives in logistic regression. However, odds are
different from probability, in that odds are not bounded by zero and one. Odds can go
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from zero to infinity. If there is an equal chance of an event occurring then the odds
are one to one. Odds that are equal to one are the same as failing to reject the null
hypothesis in logistic regression. Odds that are less than one indicate that there is a
less of a chance of an event occurring. Moreover, an odds of 1.25 is the same as
saying that there is a 25 percent increase in the chance of an event occurring. The
odds ratio is calculated using "e " (the exponential function) and the "6 " coefficient
for the comparison group. To find the odds ratio of the comparison group to the
reference group, one raises e to the b power (3). Since b = 1.792 the odds ratio
indicates that females are six times more likely than males to seek psychiatric therapy
(3a).
eb = odds ratio

(3)

2.718L792 = 6.0

(3a)

The SPSS binary logistic regression application computes the odds ratio for the
predictor variables as well as other results. Essential to this research is interpreting the
results of the model runs (Meyers, 2006).
•

The first step is to evaluate the "a " and "6 " coefficients and their
standard errors. Coefficients in logistic regression are determined by a
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). The objective of this technique
is to maximize the log likelihood of the odds that the observed values of
the dependent variable may be predicted from the observed values of the
predictors. MLE is an iterative algorithm that starts with an initial
"guestimate" and then determines the direction and magnitude of the
"a" and "6 " coefficients. In contrast, OLS Regression determines the
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coefficients by minimizing the sum of squared distances to the
regression line. Analogous to OLS, "b" coefficients close to zero
indicate that there is no effect caused by the independent variable.
•

The/? value test result determines whether the independent variable is
significantly associated with the dependent variable. It is from the "p "
value a researcher normally assesses as to whether the variable should
be included in the model or not.

•

Next, the odds ratios for the predictor variable and their respective
confidence intervals are assessed. These results were of primary
importance in determining the odds ratio, as discussed previously, of
NJROTC participation along with interaction effects of the other
predictor variables on Navy retention.

•

Finally, there are a number of tests to assess the validity of the model.
The significance of these tests (Likelihood Ration Test, Omnibus Test
of Model Coefficients, Model Summary, Psuedo R2, Hosmer and
Lemeshow Test and Wald Test) is discussed in Chapter IV when the
results of the binary logistic regression model are discussed.

The hypothesis this research question attempted to support or refute was:
Hypothesis 2: Among Navy enlisted who are retained in the Navy, there is no
significant difference between those who participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC
students.
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Research Question 4: Is there a significant difference between NJROTC graduate
cadets' intent to enlist in the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender, and
location?
Differential research was conducted on the NJROTC graduate intention to
enlist in the Navy (JUMS data) compared to the actual Navy enlistment data (DMDC
data). Cross-tabulation procedures using SPSS were used to compare the differences
of the two databases cited in the research question. However, a major problem
linking these two databases was that due to Privacy Act reasons for high school
students social security numbers were not provided in the JUMS data. As explicated
in the results chapter, there were also other problems in drawing direct comparison
between the JUMS and the DMDC databases.
The hypothesis this research question attempted to support or refute was:
Hypothesis 3: There is no difference between the JUMS database on NJROTC cadet
graduates' intent to enlist and those that actually enlist in the Navy.
Selection Bias
While selection bias is usually a concern when examining the decisions of
individuals to engage in a particular course of action, one can argue that selection bias
was not present in this study based on the following reasons. First, with respect to
participation in NJROTC, the JUMS data provides the population of individuals
enrolled in NJROTC for the period of analysis. The focus of this analysis was
whether there were distinctive characteristics of the NJROTC population relative to
the population of the US Navy, that is, attributes of two distinct populations to which
individuals select themselves were compared. Since the entire population was
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observed, the typical sampling problems of the properties of the non-observed
observations were not of concern.
Second, with respect to the testable hypotheses whether NJROTC participation
has a discernable impact on first term service outcomes, the population of individuals
who ascend to military service and who complete (and fail to complete) their first
term of service were observed. The focus of this analysis was to examine the
behavior of the population of individuals who choose to ascend to service. The
impact of NJROTC graduates who chose not to ascend was not a concern of this
study. While the differential analysis of NJROTC on individual outcomes of those
who choose a different, non-military course of action is interesting, it was beyond the
scope of this study and was thus not germane to the issue of selection bias.
Limitations and Delimitations
As stated previously, the scope of this dissertation was to determine the impact
the Navy's JROTC program has on Navy accessions and retentions. The following
are limitations and delimitations:
Limitations
The following issues placed limitations on the research:
• Because of privacy issues discussed above, social security numbers of NJROTC
cadets cannot be accessed. If cadet SSN were available, the impact NJROTC
participation has on a variety of demographic variables with respect to Navy
accessions and retentions could be easily assessed.
• A limitation in the measurement of socioeconomic status is that the recruit may
have moved from his or her family home and that the recruit's reported Zip

58

code might be from a different income level. It is assumed that this relocation
error increases as a recruit delays enlistment following his or her 18l birthday.
Further, since the median income correlation was based on the 2000 census,
new Zip codes for 2001, 2002, and 2003 were reported as having no median
income. These missing cases, which corresponded to less than 1.7 percent of
the data, were removed from the database for any analysis on socioeconomic
status. The four median income groups were divided into four categories:
Low (0 up to $43,601), Medium Low ($43,601 up to$53,026), Medium High
($53,026 up to $66,082), and High ($66,082).
• Another limitation of the present study was that the data from the DMDC do
not report JROTC or NJROTC participation of fewer than two years. It is not
reported because Navy enlisted personnel only get grade advancement credit
if they have completed three or more years of JROTC. Thus, the enlisted data
were limited to NJROTC cadets with three or more years as cadets.
• There may be bias associated with the self-reported data on graduate intent of
the JUMS database. This has ramifications for both Research Questions 1 and
4.
Delimitations
Delimitations are self-imposed limitations in the research. These are:
• The analysis of the data focused on NJROTC pre-existing data from 2001-2005
for both the JUMS and DMDC data.
• The DMDC data are limited to enlisted personnel only, since the obtained
DMDC data provided information on enlisted personnel only.
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• There are three main Navy officer entry programs: Naval Academy, Naval
Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), and Officer Candidate School
(OCS). Only the U.S. Naval Academy and NROTC track NJROTC
participation. NROTC program managers denied access to their OPMIS
database, based on Privacy Act concerns. Given this obstacle, access to the
other Navy officer program data was not pursued.
• Research Questions 3 had only three FY cohorts (2001, 2002, 2003), based on
the fact that the final accessible DMDC data was FY06. This delimitation
assumes that the metric for retention is whether a recruit completed the first
three years of his or her enlistment.
Summary
The purpose of the research was to determine whether NJROTC participation
has an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. The study's primary focus is on
NJROTC and non-NJROTC participants who enlist in the Navy. It also provides
demographic information on the career intentions of NJROTC graduates. The
research methodology is quantitative, combining descriptive and inferential statistic
techniques to answer the four research questions and three hypotheses.
The implications of this study go beyond the previous JROTC research using
survey methods studying perceptions and learning outcomes. The specific focus of
this research was to analyze pre-existing data to gather descriptive and inferential
evidence on the influence NJROTC participation has on Navy accessions and
retentions. Empirical evidence is provided in Chapter IV and V on the efficacy of the
NJROTC program. Research also provides Navy JROTC program managers
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empirical evidence on the salient effect of the directed budget priorities for the Global
War on Terror. Lastly, quantitative evidence is shown in the findings that NJROTC
cadets intend to join and are actually retained in the Navy at a higher rate than nonNJROTC accessions, which adds credence for the Navy to consider the NJROTC as a
Navy pipeline-recruiting or training program.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS
The purpose of this study was to determine whether NJROTC participation
has an influence on Navy accessions and retentions. The raw data came from two
sources, the NJROTC organization, Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS)
data, and Defense Management Data Center (DMDC). Chapter 3 described the
methodology for answering the research questions. The data analysis and results for
this dissertation was organized based on the four research questions.
Data Analysis and Results Organized by Research Questions
Research Question 1
What are the NJROTC graduates' post high school career intentions by race,
gender, location and socioeconomic status?
The host schools are asked annually to provide the Naval Education Training
Command (NETC) a variety of information on their graduating seniors. Figures and
tabular data are offered in this section to provide noteworthy findings on NJROTC
graduate intentions. The data for research question one was derived from the Navy
JROTC Unit Management System database from the Department of the Navy (2006)
and the 2000 United States census.
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Figure 3 provides the number and percentage of education career intentions
for NJROTC graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. As seen in Figure 3,
half of the NJROTC graduates plan to continue education after high school. The
education options were four-year college, junior college, or technical or vocational
school. The Total Other category consists of NJROTC graduates who were
undecided, reported employment only, or did not provide a response. Of note, there
was a seven percent rise in Total Education, 50 to 57 percent, from 2001 to 2005.
Also evident was the decreasing trend of NJROTC graduates' intent on joining the
military, decreasing from 40 to 36 percent from 2001 to 2005. Taken together with
the global war on terrorism, NJROTC cadets may have found the education option
more appealing than joining the military.
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Figure 4 shows the number and percentage of military service branch
intentions for NJROTC graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005.
Approximately 36-41 percent of the NJROTC graduating cadets intended to join the
Navy. What is also interesting is that from 2001 and 2005 between 28-34 percent of
the NJROTC cadets intended to join the Army and over 20 percent intended on
joining the Marine Corps. The Navy is definitely losing potential recruits to the Army
and Marine Corps who are on record for targeting some of their recruiting efforts at
JROTC units (Department of the Army, 1999; Dr. William McHenry, personal
communication, June 20, 2005).
1400
1200

raduate Intei

r*

1000
800
600

NJROTC

is

400
200
0
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

:

• Nnvy

1089 36% 1066 ; 38%'.1145 40% : 1146 4 1 % ; 1235 40%

• Army

871 ; 28% ; 761 . 27%

* Air Force

427

14% '. 385

636

2 1 % ; 577

Marino Corps
Coast Guard

34

1%

33

694 : 25% 878

14% : 326

12%

102

20% • 626 ; 22% \ 606
1%

39

1%

47

32% 1040 34%
4%
22%

116
663

2% '-. 46

4%
21%
1%

Figure 4: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates' military service branch
career intentions 2001 - 2005

64

Figure 5 depicts the number and percentage of the military program intentions
for NJROTC graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. From 2001 to 2005,
of the NJROTC graduates who intended to pursue a military career, approximately 80
percent intended to be enlisted personnel, while the resultant 20 percent intended to
pursue officer programs: the Academy, Boost, ROTC scholarship, and ROTC nonscholarship. The greater percentage pursuing enlisted careers suggests that NJROTC
is not an officer training program but instead an enlisted training program.
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Figure 6 summarizes the number and percentage of the graduating senior
cadets' intention to pursue employment (work full time) or undecided (did not know).
As presented here above, from 2001 to 2005 there has been no significant change in
the percentage of cadets that intended to seek employment only, approximately 6-8
percent, or that are undecided and other in their career intent, 5-7 percent.
10000
9003
8003
7000
0000

soon
u

4000

i-

O
en

loon
2003
:OOD

0

m

m

2001

2002

• EnpoymontOnly

461 : 6%

is Undecided & Other

496

ToUi NJRO-C Graduates 7571

• 495

7% ': 419

:
;

h
2033

2004

7%

512

S%

6%

: 427

5%

100% 7454 100% 7963 100%

2305

621

8%

592

7%

381

5%

365

4%

8157 100% 8S6G 100%

Figure 6: Number and percentage of NJROTC graduates reporting employment or
undecided as career intentions 2001 - 2005

66

Figure 7 illustrates the number and percentage of NJROTC graduating cadets
by race for the years 2001 through 2005. White NJROTC cadets make up the largest
percentage of NJROTC graduates. The percentage of White NJROTC graduates did
not changed appreciably from 2001 to 2005, and included approximately 52 percent
of the graduating cadets. Over the same period, Blacks have decreased from 26 to 22
percent with Hispanics increasing from 14 to 18 percent. The percentage of Asian and
Other minorities remained stable over the same time period. Figure 7 shows that
NJROTC graduated a higher percentage of Blacks and Hispanics than the
representative U.S. population average of 13 percent for each, with NJROTC
graduating Black cadets (22 to 26 percent) and Hispanic cadets (14 to 18 percent).
NJROTC graduates are also above the Navy enlisted strength percentage with DMDC
reporting in 2004 that Blacks were at 20 percent and Hispanics were at nine percent.
For officers DMDC reported even less representation with Black and Hispanic officer
strength at nine and five percent respectively. These percentages show that NJROTC
units would be an obvious minority recruiting source to meet the Navy's goal of
having a force structure that reflects the diversity of the American workforce.
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Figure 8 provides the number and percentage of the gender for NJROTC
graduating cadets for the years 2001 through 2005. From 2001 to 2005,
approximately 60 percent of the NJROTC graduates were males and 40 percent were
females. As of 2007, females made up 14 percent of the Navy enlisted force.
NJROTC could provide the Navy an obvious recruiting tool for females. The
information provided in Figures 7 and 8 is summarized in Table 6, which displays the
number and percentage of gender and racial data for NJROTC graduating cadets for
the years 2001 through 2005.
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Table 6
NJROTC Graduates Gender: Race: (2001 - 2005) - Crosstabulation
2001
Female Male

1358
34%

Male

2003
Total Female

Male

2004
Total Female

Male

2005
Total Female

Male

Total

2639 3997
66% 100%

1246 2410 3656
34.1% 65.9% 100%

1258 2744 4002
31.4% 68.6% 100%

1385 2874 4259
32.5% 67.5% 100%

1540
34%

2986 4526
66% 100%

1114
878 1992
55.9% 44.1% 100%

381 1397 1778
21.4% 78.6% 100%

835 1877
1042
55.5% 44.5% 100%

995
810 1805
55.1% 44.9% 100%

1078
57%

812 1890
43% 100%

479
607 1086
44.1% 55.9% 100%

858
455 1313
65.3% 34.7% 100%

599
752 1351
44.3% 55.7% 100%

662
760 1422
46.6% 53.4% 100%

724
811 1535
47.2% 52.8% 100%

40 199
20% 100%

161
305 466
34.5% 65.5% 100%

163
315 478
34.1% 65.9% 100%

215
302 517
41.6% 58.4% 100%

85
90 175
48.6% 51.4% 100%

405
34 439
92.3% 7.74% 100%

123
144 267
46.1% 53.9% 100%

76
117 193
39.4% 60.6% 100%

93
108 201
46.3% 53.7% 100%

3146 4425 7571
41.6% 58.4% 100%

3049 4336 7385
41.3% 58.7% 100%

3281 4876 8157
40.2% 59.8% 100%

3650 5019 8669
42.1% 57.9% 100%

110
34%

Total

2002
Total Female

211 321
66% 100%

159
80%

3183
40%

4780 7963
60% 100%

Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. From JROTC Unit Management System
Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006.

As shown, there were minimal gender fluctuations for the years 2001 and 2003-2005
with Black females making up the largest percentage of Black graduating cadets. The
range is 55 to 57 percent. White females ranged between 32 to 34 percent, Hispanic
females between 44 to 47 percent, Asian females between 34 and 41 percent, and
Other minority females 46 to 48 percent. However, in 2002 there were major gender
fluctuations, 25-30 percent, with Blacks, Asians, Hispanics and Others. Again, this
increase in minority gender representation over the actual population or even the
percentage of females in the Navy (14%) make NJROTC an ideal female minority
recruiting source.
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Table 7 reveals the number and percentage of NJROTC graduating cadets by
gender and education intention for the years 2001 through 2005. As seen here in
Table 7, from 2001 to 2005, females ranged from 32 to 41 percent not pursuing postsecondary education with males ranging from 47 to 67 percent. The intent to pursue
four-year colleges had a decreasing trend for females from 2001 to 2003 with a high
of 52 percent and a low of 27 percent of the NJROTC graduates with males having
had an increasing trend of 47 to 67 percent. For gender comparisons between 2001
and 2005, junior college intent and technical or vocational intent has had fluctuations,
up and down of 10 percent.
Table 7
NJROTC Graduates Gender: Post Secondary Education Intentions (2001 - 2005) - Crosstabulation
2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

Female

Male Total Female

Male Total Female

Male Total Female

Male Total Female

Male Total

1139

1035 2174 1013

1380 2393 1027

2668 3695 1034

2468 3502 1133

2618 3751

52%

48% 100% 42%

58% 100% 28%

72% 100% 30%

71% 100% 30%

70% 100%

647

581

666

1175 1387

1323 2710 1421

1498 2919 1653

1511 3164

53%

47% 100% 43%

57% 100% 51%

49% 100% 49%

51% 100% 52%

48% 100%

123

219

342

170

613

685

642

36%

64%

100% 45.5%

54.5% 100% 51.2%

48.8% 100% 50.4%

49.6% 100% 52.3%

47.7% 100%

Other

1237
32.3%

2590 3827 1385
67.7% 100% 39.5%

2120 3505 125
60.5% 100% 41.5%

176 301 129
58.5% 100% 36.5%

225 354 161
63.5% 100% 39.4%

248 409
60.6% 100%

Total

3146
41.6%

4425 7571 3049
58.4% 100% 41.3%

4336 7385 3183
58.7% 100% 40%

4780 7963 3281
60% 100% 40.2%

4876 8157 3650
59.8% 100% 42.1%

5019 8669
57.9% 100%

^Y,far
College

Ju lor

"
College

T"ppnTiif*£ll ^t"

. ,
Vocational

1228 509

142

312

644

1257 697

1382 703

Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. From JROTC Unit Management System
Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006.
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Table 8 shows the number and percentage of the Geographic Area from which
the NJROTC graduating cadets unit are located for the years 2001 through 2005. The
locations of these areas were described in Figure 1 on page 18 of this dissertation. As
seen in Table 8, the 11 NJROTC geographic areas had relatively the same percentage
of NJROTC graduating cadets averaging from seven to 10 percent of the total.
Analysis in each area by race and gender should be of interest to NJROTC Area
Managers but was beyond the scope of this research.
Table 8
NJROTC Graduates: NJROTC Geographic Area (2001 - 2005) - Crosstabulation

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

544
7.19%
792 10.46%
928 12.26%
830 10.96%
510
6.74%
889 11.74%
533
7.04%
670
8.85%
562
7.42%
596
7.87%
717
9.47%
7571 100.00%

582
7.88%
693
9.38%
642
8.69%
794 10.75%
798 10.81%
630
8.53%
614
8.31%
744 10.07%
601
8.14%
657
8.90%
630
8.53%
7385 100.00%

691
8.68%
798 10.02%
769
9.66%
744
9.34%
727
9.13%
609
7.65%
731
9.18%
8.92%
710
660
8.29%
751
9.43%
773
9.71%
7963 100.00%

820 10.05%
722
8.85%
779
9.55%
822 10.08%
887 10.87%
559
6.85%
9.04%
737
722
8.85%
674
8.26%
709
8.69%
726
8.90%
8157 100.00%

754
8.70%
898 10.36%
763
8.80%
837
9.66%
942 10.87%
617
7.12%
8.41%
729
9.41%
816
750
8.65%
9.82%
851
712
8.21%
8669 100.00%

Note. Distribution of NJROTC Graduates Intentions, 2001- 2005. From JROTC Unit Management
System Database, by U.S. Department of the Navy, 2006.
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Figure 9 depicts the number and percentage of NJROTC graduates'
socioeconomic status for the years 2001 through 2005. The socioeconomic status
variable for an NJROTC graduate was derived from 2000 census data based on the
NJROTC units' 5-digit Zip code. The four median income groups were divided into
four categories as noted earlier: Low Income - 0 up to $43,601; Medium Low Income
- $43,601 up to $53,026; Medium High Income - $53,026 up to $66,082; and High
Income - $66,082 and greater. From 2001 to 2005 as displayed in Figure 9, the higher
two income groups contain between 63 to 68 percent of the NJROTC graduates. One
key observation from Figure 9 is that the higher two income groups had over 62
percent of the NJROTC graduates. This helps counter those who perceive that the
military and specifically the Navy primarily recruits those from lower socioeconomic
statuses.
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Research Question 2
Are there significant differences between NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC
participants for Navy enlisted accessions by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and
socioeconomic status?
Data on Navy accessions were derived from the Defense Management Data
Center (Appendix B). Differential analysis is offered in this section comparing
NJROTC and non-NJROTC Navy accessions (Figures 10-14). Only the percent
difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC Navy accessions is offered in this
section. The actual ratio of NJROTC to non-NJROTC naval accessions for 2001 to
2005 was less than one percent of all Navy accessions. Though one may have issues
with forecasting descriptive statistics based on NJROTC numbers being such a small
percentage of the overall Navy accessions, the data are based on the population data
of Navy accessions, which does offer support for its accuracy. As stated previously,
the variable socioeconomic status, which had missing data, was tested to ensure the
sample mean was not statistically different from the population mean.
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Figure 10 shows the percentage difference between NJROTC and nonNJROTC accessions by race for the years 2001 through 2005. Positive percentages in
the figure represent the percent of NJROTC accessions for a given race category that
is greater than non-NJROTC accessions, whereas negative percentages indicate the
reverse. As seen here, there were eight percent more White non-NJROTC accessions
in 2001 indicated by the trend line starting at minus eight percent. For Black
accessions, there were eight percent more Black NJROTC accessions than nonNJROTC accessions for 2001. The difference between both White and Black Navy
accessions decreased until there was a zero percent difference in 2005. For Asians
and Other there was no appreciable difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC.
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Figure 11 shows the percentage difference of NJROTC and non-NJROTC
accessions by gender for the years 2001 through 2005. When assessing the
differences over the five year period, a higher percentage of females came from
NJROTC accessions than non-NJROTC accessions, one to five percent, with a
correspondingly lower percentage for males. This indicates that females with
NJROTC participation are slightly more likely to join the Navy than non-NJROTC
accessions with the reverse holding true for males. Not displayed in this dissertation
but assessed in the analysis of the data was that Black females joined the Navy at a 14
percent higher rate than non-NJROTC accessions: Whites females were 11 percent
lower; Asian females were 3 percent lower; and Other females showed no difference.
For males, Black NJROTC accessions were 5 percent higher, White males were 6
percent lower; Asian males were 1 percent higher, Other males showed no difference.
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Figure 12 shows the percentage difference between NJROTC and nonNJROTC accessions by AFQT score for the years 2001 through 2005. AFQT score is
divided into six categories with Category I being the highest AFQT test score,
ranging between 93 and 99, and Category V the lowest, one to nine. Of note, the two
mid-range test score categories are Category IIIA and IIIB. For the Navy, Category
IIIB test scores, 31 to 49, are considered the minimum acceptable test score to be a
Navy recruit. Recruits with lower test scores must generally show other
qualifications to be recruited by the Navy. Fewer than one percent of the Navy
accessions have Category rv or V test scores.
When assessing the differences in Figure 12, one can see that there is plus or
minus three percent difference in AFQT scores when comparing NJROTC and nonNJROTC accessions. For AFQT Category I, the highest AFQT score, the percentage
of NJROTC accessions is less than the percentage of non-NJROTC accessions. In
Category II, the percentage of NJROTC accessions is less than the percentage of nonNJROTC accessions in all years except 2001. In Category IIIA, the first average
rating for AFQT, the percentage of NJROTC accessions is the same in 2001 and
greater from 2002 through 2005 than the non-NJROTC accessions. In Category IIIB,
the second average category for AFQT scores, the percentage of NJROTC accessions
compared to non-NJROTC accessions is greater for all years. For Category IV and V,
there were few if any meaningful differences.
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Figure 12: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by
AFQT score from 2001 to 2005
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Figure 13: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC
accessions by U.S. region from 2001 to 2005. As shown in Figure 13, when
comparing the differences of NJROTC accessions and non-NJROTC accessions by
the above five regions, the most notable differences during this five-year period were
in the Southeast and Midwest. At the extremes, the Southeast had approximately 27
percent greater NJROTC accession rate, while the Midwest had a 16-19 percent fewer
accessions than non-NJROTC accessions. In other regions, the Northeast nonNJROTC accessions had an average of 10 percent greater accession rate over
NJROTC accessions, whereas the West trend started out with a 10 percent greater
accession rate in 2001 decreasing to almost zero in 2005. The Southwest had the
reverse trend in comparison to the West, starting out with a 13 percent higher
NJROTC accession rate decreasing to a negative two percent accession rate in 2005.
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Figure 13: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by
Region from 2001 to 2005
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Figure 14: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC
accessions by socioeconomic status from 2001 to 2005. See the definition of key
terms in Chapter 1 for the actual income categories. As seen here, the differences of
percentages between NJROTC and non-NJROTC of the three lower income groups
fluctuated between plus or minus seven percent over the five-year period, where as
the highest income group had a greater percentage from non-NJROTC accessions at
six to 13 percent. Specifically, the lowest income group, in 2001 and 2002, had a
higher percentage of NJROTC accessions, about six to seven percent. This trend
changed for 2003 to 2005 where difference was between one and two percent. For the
second lowest income group, there was about a three to five percent increase in
NJROTC accessions over non-NJROTC accessions except in 2002 where there was
no difference. In the second highest income group, there was no appreciable
difference from 2001 to 2002 with NJROTC accession rates three to seven percent
higher than non-NJROTC accessions from 2003 to 2005. In the highest income
group, NJROTC accession rates were 10 to 13 percent less than non-NJROTC
accessions.
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Figure 14: Percentage difference between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions by
socioeconomic status from 2001 to 2005

Research Question 3: Are there significant differences between NJROTC participants
and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted retention by race, gender, AFQT
score, location, and socioeconomic status?
Data on Navy accessions were derived from the Defense Management Data
Center. Included in this section are descriptive data and cross tabulations which
helped guide the inferential examination of NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions
with respect to retention. The second section provides the binary logistic model with a
summary of the results of the model. The descriptive data provided insight into the
variables that later formed the logistic regression model. Specifically, the reference
category (sometimes referred as the "omitted variable") of the predictor variables is
identified for the model. The dependent variable in this analysis is the dichotomous

82

variable "retain," whether or not the Navy enlisted person was retained or not within
the first three years of enlistment. The dichotomous predictor variables include
Gender and NJROTC participation. The categorical variables are accession year, race,
AFQT score, socioeconomic status, and U.S. Region. Before the binary logistic
regression model is created, it is important to highlight any interactions between the
dependent variable "retain" and the predictor variables. This is accomplished in the
following Descriptive Statistics section using cross-tabulation data.
Descriptive Statistics
Table 9 provides the number and percentage of Navy enlisted personnel
separated from the Navy within their first three years of enlistment. As seen in the
table total accessions had decreased from 2001 to 2003 with the overall percentage of
Navy accessions retained increasing from 73 to 76 percent. For chronological reasons
the year 2001 is the reference category (omitted variable) for this model.
Table 9

Number and percentage of Navy accessions retained or separated
within the first three years of enlistment: 2001 - 2003
2001

2002

2003

Total

Separated

13424

26.6%

10356

23.4%

9444

23.80%

33224

Retained

37097

73.4%

33820

76.6%

30159

76.20%

101076

75.3%

50521

100.0%

44176

100.0%

39603

100.00%

134300

100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management Data Center
Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

24.7%
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Table 10 displays the number and percentage of NJROTC and non-NJROTC
accessions from 2001 to 2003. Noteworthy in this table was the relatively small
percentage of NJROTC accessions, fewer than one percent. Although this number is
small compared to all Navy accessions, it is still significant since it is the total
population of Navy accessions that reported participating in NJROTC under the
DMDC Youth Program Code. Non-NJROTC Navy accessions served as the
reference category for this variable in the model.
Table 10
Number and percentage

of NJROTC and non NJROTC Navy accessions:

2001

NJROTC
Non NJROTC
Total

365
50156
50521

2002

0.7%
99.3%
100.0%

350
43826
44176

2001-2003

2003

0.8%
99.2%
100.0%

306
39297
39603

Total

0.8%
99.2%
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management Data Center
Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

1021
133279
134300

0.8%
99.2%
100.0%
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Table 11 shows the number and percentage of NJROTC graduates and nonNJROTC accessions that were retained and separated from the Navy within three
years of enlistment date of Fiscal Year 2001-2003. As described in the table,
NJROTC Navy accessions between 2001 and 2003 retained at a five percent greater
rate than non-NJROTC accessions. As stated previously, non-NJROTC accessions
served as the reference category in the model.
Table 11
Number and percentage of Navy Accessions by NJROTC
or non NJROTC separated or retained from 2001 to 2003

NJROTC
Non NJROTC
Total

Separated

Retained

Total

196
19.2%
33028
24.8%
33224
24.7%

825
80.8%
100251
75.2%
101076
75.3%

1021
100.0%
133279
100.0%
134300
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From
Defense Management Data Center Database,
by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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Table 12 shows the number and percentage of Navy accessions by gender who
were separated from or retained in the Navy within three years of enlistment date of
Fiscal Year 2001-2003. In Table 12, Males were retained in the Navy at
approximately two percent greater rates than female accessions. Further, from 2001
to 2003, the Navy retained 84,096 males verses 16,980 females. Thus, males served
as the reference category for the model.
Table 12
Number and percentage of Navy Accessions
by gender separated or retained from 2001 to 2003
Separated

Retained

Total

27164
24.4%
6060
26.3%
33224
24.7%

84096
75.6%
16980
73.7%
101076
75.3%

111260
100.0
23040
100.0%
134300
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From
Defense Management Data Center Database,
by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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Table 13 shows the number and percentage of Navy accessions by race who
were separated from or retained in the Navy within three years of enlistment date of
Fiscal Year 2001-2003. There was no appreciable difference between White and
Black Navy accessions with both having a 77 percent retention rate; Asians retained
at an 85 percent rate with Other races retained at 64 percent. Since Whites make up
the largest number of Navy accessions retained, White Navy accessions served as the
reference category for the model.
Table 13
Number and percentage of Navy Accessions
by race separated or retained from 2001 to 2003

White
Black
Asian
Other
Total

Separated

Retained

Total

17977
22.8%
5826
22.9%
843
14.2%
8578
35.8%
33224
24.7%

60968
77.2%
19631
77.1%
5077
85.8%
15400
64.2%
101076
75.3%

78945
100.0%
25457
100.0%
5920
100.0%
23978
100.0%
134300
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003.
From Defense Management Data Center Database,
by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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Table 14 summarizes the number and percentage of Navy accessions by
AFQT score who were separated from the Navy within three years of enlistment date
of Fiscal Year 2001-2003. There were minimal differences with respect to retention
between Category II, IIIA, IIIB and IV with accessions for all falling between 73 and
78 percent retained. AFQT Category I had the greatest percentage retained over the
three years of those that reported their scores with an 82 percent retention rate. The
Unknown category, which represented those accessions who did not have a reported
score, had the greatest retention rate with over 90.8 percent retention rate. Category
IIIB had the greatest number of Navy accessions having 46,691 out of 134,300 and as
such, served as the reference category for the model.
Table 14
Number and percentage of Navy accessions' Armed Forces Qualification
Test score and Separted or Retained Crosstabulation: 2001 - 2003
Separated

Retained

Total

5184
82.1%
34188
77.7%
25700
72.7%
34233
73.3%

6311
100.0%
44012
100.0%
35327

48
78.7%

61
100.0%
1898

AFQTI

93 to 99

AFQT II

65 to 92

1127
17.9%
9824

AFQT IIIA

50 to 64

22.3%
9627

AFQT IIIB

31 to 49

AFQT IV

10 to 30

Unknown
Total

27.3%
12458
26.7%
13
21.3%
175
9.2%
33224
24.7%

1723
90.8%
101076
7.3%

100.0%
46691
100.0%

100.0%
134300
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001-2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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Table 15 gives the percentage of Navy accessions by U.S. Region that were
retained or separated from the Navy within three years of enlistment of Fiscal Year
2001-2003. In this table, there was little difference with respect to geographic
location and Navy retention with all regions retaining between 73 and 78 percent.
The No Zip category included accessions who either did not report their home of
record or joined the Navy outside the United States. Since the Southeast had the
greatest numbers of Navy accessions, 36,434 out of 134,300, it served as the
reference category for the model.
Table 15
Number and percentage of Navy accessions from 5 US REGIONS
and Separated or Retained Crosstabulation: 2001 - 2003

5 US REGIONS

West
South West
Mid West
South East
North East
No Zip
Total

Separated

Retained

Total

6380
21.5%
5099
25.6%
6913
26.3%
9519
26.1%
5132
24.6%
181
16.5%
33224
24.7%

23359
78.5%
14800
74.4%
19366
73.7%
26915
73.9%
15723
75.4%
913
83.5%
101076
75.3%

29739
100.0%
19899
100.0%
26279
100.0%
36434
100.0%
20855
100.0%
1094
100.0%
134300
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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Table 16 presents the number and percentage of Navy accessions by
socioeconomic status who were retained or separated from the Navy within three
years of enlistment of Fiscal Year 2001-2003. Since there were missing data (less
than 1.7 percent of the data), the variables for both the sample and population were
means tested. The results of the means test showed that there was no difference
between the population and sample databases for the variables being analyzed (See
appendix C). There is no meaningful difference based on socioeconomic status for
Navy accessions with all four income categories having an about a 75 percent
retention rate. The High income group is the reference category for the model having
the greatest number of Navy accessions with 44,735 out of 132,061.
Table 16
Number and percentage of Navy accessions socioeconomic status
and Separated or Retained Crosstabulation: 2001 - 2003

MEDIAN INCOME
GROUP
Low
Medium Low
Medium High
High
Total

Separated

Retained

Total

5424
25.2%
7003
25.1%
9312
24.6%
10960
24.8%
32699
24.8%

16142
74.8%
20890
74.9%
28555
75.4%
33775
75.2%
99362
75.2%

21566
100.0%
27893
100.0%
37867
100.0%
44735
100.0%
132061
100.0%

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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Reviewing the relevant descriptive statistics, the most likely Navy accession
was a non-NJROTC White male in the High socioeconomic group from the Southeast
with an AFQT category score of 3B. Based upon these data, these characteristics
were the reference categories that made up the binary logistic regression model.
Binary Logistic Regression Model
The independent variable Separation Program Designation (SPD) was
regrouped into a dichotomous variable with categories of Retained or Separated
before completing three years of active service. Three years of service is considered
the minimum time of enlistment. Even though some accessions were separated from
the Navy for non-adverse reasons, they were still grouped with the accessions that did
not meet the minimum contract of three years. The criterion variable for this research
is dichotomous (retained in the Navy within three years of enlistment or not). Binary
logistic regression analysis was used to model a Navy accession's retention prior to
completing his or her first term of enlistment. The two dichotomous predictor
variables used for this research are NJROTC participation and gender. The predictor
variables that are categorical are race, AFQT scores, socioeconomic status, and
region. The full list of variables included in the model along with a description of
each variable is provided in Table 17.
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Table 17
Specification of Variables in Final Model
Variable
Dependent Variable
RETAIN
Dichotomous Predictor Variables
NJROTC REF
Gender
Categorical Predictor Variable
RACE REF WHITE
BLACK
ASIAN
OTHER
MED INC REF HI
LO INCOME
MEDIUM LO INCOME
MEDIUM HI INCOME
REGION REF SE
WEST
SOUTHWEST
MIDWEST
NORTHEAST
NO ZIP
AFQT REF 3B
AFQT CAT 1
AFQT CAT 2
AFQT CAT 3A
AFQT CAT 4 & 5
AFQT UNK
YEAR REF 2001
YEAR 2002
YEAR 2003

Description and Coding
0 if the Navy accession was separated , 1 if accession was retained

0 if the Navy accession was a Non NJROTC accession, 1 for NJROTC accession
0 if the Navy accession was a Male, 1 if the accession was a Female
0 if the Navy accession's race was White - Reference Category
1 if the Navy accession's race was Black
Asian
3 if the Navy accession's race was Other
0 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Hi Income Group Reference Category
1 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Lo Income Group
2 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Medium Lo Income
Group
3 if the Navy accession's Medium Income group was from the Medium Hi Income
Group
0 if the Navy accession's region was from the Southeast
1 if the Navy accession's region was from the West
2 if the Navy accession's region was from the Southwest
3 if the Navy accession's region was from the Midwest
4 if the Navy accession's region was from the Northeast
5 if the Navy accession's region was unknown
0 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 3B - Reference Category
1 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 1
2 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 2
3 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 3A
4 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was 4 OR 5
5 if the Navy accession's AFQT category was UNKNOWN
0 if the Navy accession's year was 2001 - Reference Category
1 if the Navy accession's year was 2002
2 if the Navy accession's year was 2003

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001 - 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2001 - 2003.

Model estimation was accomplished using two separate programs for binary
regression models: binary logistic and probit. The probit model was not considered
an optimum model based on the fact that the logit and probit model yield similar
results for probabilities between .20 and .80. Further, the probit model does not offer
the log odds information that is provided by the logit model. Therefore, the binary
logistic, which offers several features to handle variable interaction effects, was used.
Stepwise regression was also conducted in the exploratory phase for purposes of pure
prediction. At the conclusion of the exploratory phase of conducting model runs, the
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final model and the respective choice of variables was based on what made sense
theoretically, as opposed to allowing the choice of the model based solely on a
computer algorithm. This is supported by Menard who claims, "there appears to be
general agreement that the use of computer-controlled stepwise procedures to select
variables is inappropriate for theory testing because it capitalizes on random
variations in the data and produces results that tend to be idiosyncratic and difficult to
replicate in any sample other than the sample in which they were originally obtained"
(p.54, 2002). Based on this theoretical model selection, an explanation of the results
for the logistic regression model follows.
The first graphic displayed in the analysis was the Case Processing Summary
in Table 18 that provided the number of Navy accessions being analyzed. For this
study, all accessions from 2001 to 2003 were included except for 2,239 cases. It is
important to take a moment to discuss these missing cases, which were maintained in
the limitation section of the methods chapter. These cases were excluded based on
having no socioeconomic status data. The reason for that was the socioeconomic
status variable was based on the home of record Zip code the Navy accessions
reported in enlistment documents. Since the number was 2,239 out of 134,300, less
than 1.7 percent of the cases, it was not considered a major problem to exclude these
cases from the model based on the means test that was mentioned earlier.
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Table 18
Case Processing Summary
N
Selected Cases

Included in Analysis
Missing Cases
Total

Unselected Cases
Total

Percent

132061
2239
134300
0
134300

98.3
\1_
100
0
100

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

Included in the binary logistic regression output are such goodness-of-fit
measures as the model chi-squares, log likelihood, pseudo measures of R square using
the Cox and Snell and the Nagelkerke test, and the Hosmer and Lemshow test, which
are described next. Results of the logistic analysis indicated in Table 19 by the model
chi-squares provides a statistically significant improvement over the constant only
model, X2 (20, N- 132,061) = 3460.53. This clearly suggests that the independent
variables improve the prediction of the outcome.
Table 19
Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients

Step 1

Step
Block
Model

Chi-square

df

Sig.

3460.53
3460.53
3460.53

20
20
20

0
0
0

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.
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The Model Summary table, shown in Table 20, presents three measures of how
well the logistic regression model fits the data. The -2 Log likelihood statistic is
144365.63. For this particular logit model, one must look at the likelihood ratio chisquare. That measure is defined as 2(Li - L0), where Lo represents the log likelihood
for the "constant only" model, and L] is the log likelihood for the full model with
constant and predictors. This is the probability of obtaining this chi-square statistic
(144365.63) if there is in fact no effect of the independent variables, taken together,
on the dependent variable. This statistic normally has little value except for
comparing different logistic models. The Cox & Snell R Square (.03) and Nagelkerke
(.04) are pseudo R measures. These two pseudo R squared tests were used to
determine the percentage of variance in the dependent variable explained by the
independent variable in logistic regression and are analogous to R" generated in
multiple regression analysis. Based on these R measures, the model only explained
three or four percent of the variation of Navy retention.
Table 20
Model

Summary

-2 Log likelihood

Cox & Snell R Square

144365.63

0.03

Nagelkerke R Square

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

0.04
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The Hosmer and Lemeshow Test in Table 21 provided a formal test assessing
whether the predicted probabilities match the observed probabilities. In this research,
the goodness-of-fit statistic is 86.62, and is associated with a p value of .00, indicating
a close match between the predicted and observed probabilities.
Table 21
Hosmer and Lemeshow Test
Chi-square

df

Sig.

86.62

8

0.00

Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001-2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

Prediction success for the cases listed in the model was 75.2 percent. This
percentage is based on the number retained, 99,362, divided by the total number of
Navy accessions in the model 132,061. Based on the descriptive statistics of the
predictor variables the most likely Navy accession was a non-NJROTC white male
from the Southeast with an AFQT category 3B from the Medium High
socioeconomic status. These along with the accession year of 2001 were the reference
categories used in the model.
Taken together, the results of the various exploratory analyses yielded the
final binary logistic regression model:
Ln((Pr Retain)/l-Pr(Total Accession)) = B0+ B,(NJROTC) + B2(GENDER) + B3(BLACK) +
+B4(ASIAN) + B5(OTHER) + B6(LO INCOME) + B7(MED LO INCOME)+ B8(MED HI
INCOME) +B 9 (WEST) + B10(SOUTHWEST) +B„(MIDWEST) + B12(NORTHEAST) +
Bl3(OTHER) + BI4(AFQT 1) + B,5(AFQT 2) + B16(AFQT 3B) + B17(AFQT 4) + BI8(AFQT
UNK) + B19(2002) + B20(2003)
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Table 22 displays the regression coefficients (B), the Standard Error (S.E.),
the Wald statistics, significance level, odds ratio [Exp (B)], and the 95% confidence
intervals (CI) for odds ratios (OR) for each of the predictors. The logistic regression
coefficients reveal the amount of change in the log odds when there is a one-unit
change in the predictor variable holding all other variables constant. A coefficient
close to zero implies that there is no change due to that predictor variable. It is
important to note that regression coefficients (B) do not tell us as much about the
variable's importance for the research than the exponentiated coefficients [Exp (B)]
with their respective confidence intervals. It is these odds ratios that are the center of
the discussion on the extent to which the predictor variables impact the dependent
variable retention. The confidence intervals are also important in that the relatively
small confidence intervals for all the predictor variables suggest an acceptable level
of precision in the model's predictor variables. The Wald test reports that all the
predictor variables were statistically significant predictors of retaining naval
accessions (except for MIDWEST, AFQT 3A and AFQT 4&5). This test is analogous
to the "t" test in multiple regression.
As stated previously, the results of the Exp (B) column, the odds ratio, and
their respective confidence intervals provided the most meaningful data from the
model data listed in Table 22 and is the highlight of the next discussion.
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Table 22

Logistic Regression Result from 2001-2003 DM DC Data
B

S.E.

Wald

df

Sig.

Exp(B)

95.0% C.l.for EXP(B)
Lower

NJROTC
GENDER

Bi

0.37

0.08

B2

-0.06

0.02

RACE_REF_WHITE
BLACK

B3

ASIAN
OTHER

Upper

1

0.00

1.45

1.24

1.70

0.94

0.91

0.97

1.10

1.06

1.14

13.32

1

0.00

2217.63

3

0.00

26.84

1

0.00

0.10

0.02

B4

0.46

0.04

138.35

1

0.00

1.59

1.47

1.71

B5

-0.69

0.02

1649.33

1

0.00

0.50

0.49

0.52

32.94

3

0.00

MED_INC_REF_HI
LO INCOME

20.91

B6

0.11

0.02

30.57

1

0.00

1.12

1.08

1.17

MEDIUM LO INCOME

B7

0.06

0.02

11.95

1

0.00

1.07

1.03

1.10

MEDIUM HI INCOME

B8

0.05

0.02

1.05

1.02

1.09

1.39

1.51

REGION_REF_SE

9.55

1

0.00

512.17

5

0.00

WEST

B9

0.37

0.02

347.71

1

0.00

1.45

SOUTHWEST

B

10

0.20

0.02

88.08

1

0.00

1.22

1.17

1.27

MIDWEST

B11

0.01

0.02

0.11

1

0.74

1.01

0.97

1.05

NORTHEAST

B12

0.16

0.02

58.26

1

0.00

1.17

1.13

1.22

NOZIP

B13

1.01

0.10

2.76

2.26

3.35

AFQT_REF_3B

101.66

1

0.00

656.90

5

0.00

AFQT CAT 1

B14

0.51

0.04

202.86

1

0.00

1.66

1.55

1.78

AFQT CAT 2

Bis

0.25

0.02

230.19

1

0.00

1.28

1.24

1.33

AFQT CAT 3A

B«

-0.01

0.02

0.12

1

0.73

0.99

0.96

1.03

AFQT CAT 4 & 5

B17

0.31

0.32

0.96

1

0.33

1.36

0.74

2.52

AFQT UNK

Bis

1.26

0.08

242.46

1

0.00

3.52

3.00

4.12

161.27

2

0.00

YEAR_REF_2001
YEAR 2002
YEAR 2003

B19

0.16

0.02

112.11

1

0.00

1.18

1.14

1.21

B20

0.17

0.02

118.97

1

0.00

1.19

1.15

1.23

0.82

0.02

1

Constant
1407.18
0.00
2.28
Bo
Note. Distribution of naval accessions for 2001- 2003. From Defense Management
Data Center Database, by U.S. Department of Defense, 2006.

When assessing the odds ratio in column Exp (B), Navy accessions with
NJROTC participation were 45 percent more likely to retain in the Navy for their first
three years of enlistment than non-NJROTC accessions, adjusting for gender, race,
region, AFQT score, socioeconomic status, and year of accession. One can also see
that at the 95 percent confidence interval, the lower limit was 1.24 and the upper limit
was 1.70, which equates to a 24 to 70 percent probability that NJROTC accessions
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were more likely to retain than non-NJROTC accessions. Thus, the influence of
NJROTC, which was the basis of this research, was found to have a positive effect on
naval accessions retaining in the Navy for their first term of enlistment. The next step
focuses on discussing the interaction affects of the other predictor variables.
Gender was significant when holding all other variables constant. Females had
a six percent decrease in the odds of retaining when compared to males holding all
other variables in the model constant.
For Race, all categories when referenced to White Navy accessions were
significant. The Black Navy accession had a 10 percent increase in the odds of
retaining when compared to the White Navy accession holding all other variables in
the model constant. The Asian Navy accession had a 59 percent increase in the odds
of retaining holding all other variables in the model constant; and the unknown Navy
accession, which most likely contains large proportion of Hispanics, had a 50 percent
decrease in the odds of retaining when compared to White Navy accessions holding
all other variables in the model constant.
For socioeconomic status, all categories of income when referenced to the
High income group were significant. The Low income group had a 12 percent
increase in the odds of retaining when compared to the High income group holding all
other variables in the model constant. The Low Medium income group had a six
percent increase in the odds holding all other variables in the model constant; and the
High Medium income group had a five percent increase in the odds holding all other
variables in the model constant.
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For Region, all regions when referenced to the Southeast were significant
except for the Midwest with a reported significance value of .74. It is important to
note that this predictor variable does not have a meaningful difference from the
reference variable. This can be also seen from the reported confidence interval with
the lower limit of .97 and the upper limit reported as 1.01, indicating an odds ratio
close to one to one resulting in a failure to reject the null hypothesis for this particular
variable. The West had a 45 percent increase in the odds of retaining when compared
to the Southeast holding all other variables in the model constant. The Southwest had
a 22 percent increase in the odds of retaining holding all other variables in the model
constant; the Northeast had a 17 percent increase in the odds of retaining holding all
other variables in the model constant; and those that did not report a Zip code had a
176 percent increase in the odds holding all other variables in the model constant.
For enlisted qualification test scores using AFQT categories compared to the
reference AFQT Category 3B, all variables were significant except AFQT Category
3A and 4, with their respective significance values at .73 and .33. The AFQT
Category 1 had a 66 percent increase in the odds of retaining holding all other
variables in the model constant; the AFQT Category 2 had a 28 percent increase in
the odds of retaining holding all other variables in the model constant; and those that
had missing AFQT score had a 252 percent increase in the odds holding all other
variables in the model constant.
For Accession Year, all categories of the year of Navy accessions when
referenced to 2001 were significant. The accessions from 2002 had a 18 percent
increase in the odd of being retained when compared to 2001 accessions holding all

100

other variables constant. The 2002 accessions had a 19 percent increase in the odds of
being retained when compared to the 2001 Navy accessions holding all other
variables constant.
Research Question 4
Is there a significant difference between NJROTC graduate cadets' intent to enlist in
the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender, and location?
The Navy JUMS database, which contains the NJROTC graduate intent data,
was compared to the DMDC database containing the actual accessions data. When
the actual data were compared, the results showed that over a three-year period only
40 percent of those who intended on enlisting in the Navy per the JUMS data were
recorded as enlisting per the DMDC data. These low percentages prevented drawing a
reasonable link between the JUMS and the DMDC database and thus conducting
further analysis. Given the fact that social security numbers were unavailable from
NJROTC Unit for Privacy Act reasons cited by the NETC, there was no way to track
an NJROTC graduate's intentions from the JUMS database with actual DMDC
accessions data.
The anomaly that the percentages were so far apart is most likely due to
several reasons. First of all, the DMDC database tracks only JROTC accessions who
report have three or four years of JROTC, which excludes accessions with one or two
years. Secondly, some of the NJROTC who stated they intended to enlist may not
have enlisted. Finally, some of the NJROTC graduates may have changed their
desired branch of enlistment and enlisted in another service. Because of this disparity
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in data, further analysis of these data was considered too imprecise and, as a result,
this research question will not be addressed further.
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CHAPTER 5
FINDINGS, POLICY IMPLICATIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
FURTHER RESEARCH
The current literature shows the positive impact of the Junior Reserve Officer
Training Corps participation on the values and educational performance of
participants (Hawkins, 1988, Roberts, 1991; Bailey et al, 1992; Perruse, 1997; CSIS,
1999; Logan, 2000; Hicks, 2000; Demoulin & Ritter, 2000; Bulach, 2002; Morris,
2003; Marks, 2004). However, several articles were also reviewed that argued for
JROTC's removal from high school campuses based on the belief that military
recruiting efforts should not be represented on high school campuses (Berlowitz,
2000; Ayers, 2006; Barbassa, 2008; Johnson, 2008). More importantly, it should be
noted that most of the JROTC literature is based on small-scale survey research and
anecdotal evidence, with both sides of the controversy providing little quantifiable
evidence on the return on investment of the program for the U.S. military.
Limited research from the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) using Defense
Management Data Center (DMDC) accessions data does provide empirical evidence
suggesting that JROTC participation has a positive impact on military accessions and
retentions (Laurence & Estrada, 2003; Walls, 2003; Days & Ang, 2004; Hentz &
Packwood, 2007). While NPS research provides quantifiable evidence for all of
JROTC, there is a paucity of empirical evidence on Navy JROTC; however, the
results of the research reported in this dissertation provide empirical evidence on the
positive correlation between NJROTC participation and Navy accessions and
retentions.
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The purpose of this study was to conduct an empirical analysis of NJROTC
graduate intent data and Navy accessions data to determine the impact NJROTC
participation has on Navy accessions and retentions. As described earlier, the
methodology for the study was a quantitative analysis of pre-existing data. The data
received from the Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) consisted of five
databases from 2001 to 2005 with NJROTC intent data on approximately 8,000
records per year. Navy enlisted accessions data that were received from DMDC also
contained five databases from the fiscal years 2001 to 2005 with approximately
40,000 records in each. As mentioned in the methodology chapter, selection bias was
considered and deemed not a factor considering the data analyzed were the population
data of NJROTC graduates and Navy accessions.
The following research questions were addressed in this dissertation: (1) What
are the NJROTC graduates' post-high school career intentions by race,
gender, location, and socioeconomic status? (2) Are there significant differences
between NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC participants for Navy enlisted
accessions by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and socioeconomic status? (3)
Are there significant differences between NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC
participants for Navy enlisted retention by race, gender, AFQT score, location, and
socioeconomic status? (4) Is there a significant difference between NJROTC
graduate cadets' intent to enlist in the Navy and their actual behavior by race, gender,
and location? An attempt at linking the JUMS and DMDC data as guided by Research
Question 4, and as discussed in Chapter 4, showed that the linkage was too imprecise
and deemed impractical for further analysis.
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Summary of Findings
Analyzing the Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) on NJROTC
graduate intent data provided the following descriptive statistics to answer Research
Question 1.
From 2001 to 2005, 52 percent of more than 40,000 NJROTC graduates
intended on pursuing four-year college, junior college, or technical/vocation schools.
In the same period, seven percent chose full-time employment with five percent
undecided or marking "other." The remaining NJROTC graduates, 36 percent,
intended on pursuing a military career as an officer or enlisted person. This high
percentage of NJROTC students pursuing the military was supported by the literature,
which reported JROTC students are five times more likely to join the military than
non-JROTC students (Laurence & Estrada, 2003). As expected, the Navy had the
greatest percentage of NJROTC cadets who intended on joining the military with 39
percent. Next, the Army had 29 percent; the Marine Corps had 21 percent; and the
Air Force had the figure at 11 percent.
From 2001 to 2005, the NJROTC graduates were 52 percent White, 24 percent
Black, 16 percent Hispanic, five percent Asian, and three percent Other. The
percentage of NJROTC graduates for Black and Hispanics is above the U.S.
population average, which is 13 percent for both groups. In addition, this is also
above the U.S. Navy average of 15 percent for Blacks and nine percent for Hispanic
personnel as reported in 2004 by the DMDC. These findings were also voiced by
other NPS studies that cite JROTC as a good recruiting source for minority groups
(Laurence & Estrada, 2003; Days & Ang, 2004). As a result, this makes NJROTC an
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attractive resource for Navy recruiters who are trying to achieve the Chief of Naval
Operation's goal of a Navy that represents the changing face of America (Admiral
Michael Mullen, personal communication, September 22, 2005; Admiral Gary
Roughhead, personal communication, March 3, 2008).
NJROTC female participants' intent to join the Navy remained stable from
2001 to 2005 at approximately 40 percent. Though 40 percent is below the female
representation in the American workforce of 46 percent, it is well above the 15
percent Navy female representation, making NJROTC an appealing resource to
recruit females. Noteworthy is the percentage of female Blacks and Hispanics whose
intent to join the Navy from 2003 to 2005 averaged 56 and 45 percent respectively.
This parallels findings in the literature by Laurence and Estrada who found similar
percentages (2003).
Using the socioeconomic status variable, NJROTC graduates were found to be
from higher income groups than non-NJROTC accessions. This may or may not be
of significance to the Navy with respect to recruiting, but it is a data point dispelling
the myth that the military, including NJROTC, recruits primarily from those at lower
socioeconomic status levels (Berlowitz, 2000).
Next, using the Defense Management Data Center (DMDC) database,
NJROTC participants and non-NJROTC participants were compared from 2001 to
2005 to answer Research Question 2.
When NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions were compared by race, Black
NJROTC accessions showed a seven percent increase over Black non-NJROTC
accessions from 2001 to 2003, decreasing to 2.9 percent in 2004 and then to no
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difference in 2005. This decreasing trend for Black accessions contradicts similar
research that showed Black JROTC accessions having a five to seven percent higher
accessions rate from 1990 to 2001 than their non-JROTC counterpart (Laurence &
Estrada, 2003). Asians and Other (includes Hispanics) race categories showed similar
trends with Whites showing no appreciable difference from 2001 to 2005.
The female NJROTC accessions had a slightly greater percentage than their
non-NJROTC accessions counterparts. From 2001 to 2005, NJROTC female
accessions had a 5.5 percent greater differential in 2005, decreasing to one percent in
2003 and then increasing to 4.4 percent in 2005. This supports previous research
expressing that female JROTC accessions are more likely to join the military than
non-JROTC female accessions (Laurence and Estrada, 2003). Moreover, during the
same five-year period, Black female NJROTC accessions had the greatest difference
with a 14 percent greater accession rate into the Navy than their non-NJROTC
accession counterparts. For males, over the same period, Black NJROTC accessions
showed a five percent higher accession rate than non-NJROTC accessions while
White males showed the opposite. It is important to note that in 2005 the difference
for both Black females and males between NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions
decreased to zero. This decrease has been highlighted in news reports based on the
disapproval of the war in Iraq by Blacks (Philpott, 2007).
When assessing qualification for enlistment using Armed Force Qualification
Test (AFQT) scores, the findings indicated that non-NJROTC accessions had a
slightly greater percentage from the higher two AFQT scores (Category I and II),
averaging about two percent greater over the five-year period. The middle two scores
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(Category IIIA and B), averaged three percent greater for NJROTC accessions.
Though not a dramatic difference, it supports the Laurence and Estrada study which
also reported similar results for JROTC and non-JROTC accessions. The lower two
AFQT scores (Category IV and V) showed no appreciable difference.
When assessing location for the five U.S. regions, all showed a stable trend
with the Southeast averaging almost 30 percent greater NJROTC Navy accessions
over the five-year period studied. The Southwest showed a decreasing trend for
NJROTC accessions averaging five percent greater than non-NJROTC accessions.
The remaining regions had a greater percentage of non-NJROTC accessions, with
Midwest averaging 17 percent greater, and the Northeast averaging 11 percent greater
from 2001 to 2005. Navy accessions reporting the category Other showed no
difference. It appears that these regional results are reported in this present study for
the first time in the existing JROTC literature.
The socioeconomic status data showed NJROTC accessions had a greater
percentage from the Low, Medium Low, and Medium High income groups whereas
non-NJROTC accessions showed about a nine percent greater difference in the High
income group. This in itself could suggest that the military is a more attractive
opportunity for NJROTC accessions than non-NJROTC accessions at the lower three
income groups. Since the accessions were enlisted accessions only, perhaps NJROTC
graduating cadets in the higher income group pursued a career as an officer, which
was not tracked by the DMDC data.
The above findings suggest rejecting the hypothesis offered in the
methodology chapter - Among Navy enlisted accessions, there is no significant
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difference between those who participated in NJROTC and those who did not.
NJROTC participation showed significant differences on Navy accessions with Black
females, recruits from the Southeast, and recruits from the lower three socioeconomic
status groups. Other NPS studies substantiate that there was a positive association
between JROTC participation and military accessions (Laurence & Estrada, 2003;
Days & Ang, 2004).
The DMDC database from fiscal year 2001 to 2003 was also used to answer
Research Question 3.
For apparently the first time in the Navy JROTC literature it is believed, a
logistic regression model was created using Navy retention as the dependent variable
and NJROTC participation as the primary predictor variable to determine the
association NJROTC has on Navy retention. Also assessed were the interactions of
other variables on Navy retention. The findings support previous JROTC studies by
NPS suggesting that JROTC participation has a strong positive association on
military retention (Hentz, 2007; Laurence & Estrada, 2003; Days & Ang, 2004). The
noteworthy finding based on the logistic regression model was that NJROTC
accessions are 45 percent more likely to retain in their first term of enlistment over
non-NJROTC participants after holding all the other variables in the model constant.
The results from this model suggest that the hypothesis that among Navy enlisted who
are retained in the Navy, there is no significant difference between those who
participated in NJROTC and non-NJROTC accessions should be rejected.
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Policy-Making Implications
This study has policy-making implications for the Navy, local school districts,
and anti-JROTC organizations. These organizations will be the focus of the
discussion.
Implications for Navy Policy-Making
As mentioned, a high percentage of NJROTC graduates intended on joining
the Army and Marine Corps. It was also found that the Army and Marine Corps
actively recruit the service JROTC units, whereas the Navy does not. The Navy
continues to maintain that the NJROTC program is not a recruiting tool. In spite of
this, Navy leaders in the Navy Recruiting Command and NJROTC Headquarters
could replicate this research to compare the benefits of recruiting from this period of
analysis, 2001 to 2005, to that of the future. At the same time, the Navy can continue
to justify NJROTC accessions as only a side recruiting benefit based on the
comparably small numbers of NJROTC graduating cadets, which continues to
represent less than two percent of those who plan to enter the Navy as enlisted
personnel or officers. Moreover, Navy leaders can also state that this unintended
recruiting benefit from NJROTC could be because NJROTC cadets had preselected to
join the military before NJROTC had any influence on their decision to join the Navy
(Days & Ang, 2004).
Overall the policy implications of this research suggests that the Navy could
justify continued funding of NJROTC based on graduating cadets intention to join the
Navy, access to minorities, females, and the savings associated with retention. Yet,
even with these potential benefits, one cannot deny that justifying NJROTC for its
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recruiting benefits could also result in a major policy failure in that it could be the
impetus that causes viable NJROTC Units to close. Thus, with this in mind, it may
behoove the Navy leadership to continue to stress the citizenship-training objective
over the collateral recruiting benefits. On the other hand, with 198 schools on the
NJROTC waiting list and the Army and Marine Corps actively recruiting at NJROTC
Units, it may be time to add recruiting JROTC students as a goal for NJROTC and the
Navy Recruiting Command.
Implications for Local School District Policy-Making
While local school district leaders are generally pleased at having a JROTC
unit that stresses citizenship and leadership, they continue to face criticism for having
the military on high school campuses. The policy implication this research has on
local school districts is that it could provide empirical evidence of the recruiting
benefits for NJROTC to those who argue against JROTC on high school campuses.
Evidence that suggests recruiting is more than an unintended benefit to the Navy, or
to the military in general, with dwindling school budgets could tip the scales in favor
of those that argue against JROTC.
Implications for Anti-JROTC Organizations Policy-Making
In the literature review, organizations that take an anti-JROTC stance were
discussed. This research provides added evidence that could be used by these
organizations to show there is quantifiable evidence that NJROTC units are
benefiting the Navy in its recruitment efforts, unintended or not. Empirical evidence
that NJROTC offers the Navy recruitment benefits coupled with existing Navy policy
to provide special incentive considerations into officer entry programs and
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entitlements for advanced promotion upon enlistment make it difficult to argue that
NJROTC is not a recruiting program.
Recommendations for Future Research
With 198 high schools on the waiting list to have a NJROTC Unit on their
campus, cost benefit analyses should be conducted by the four JROTC service
programs to determine what the proper service mix should be for adding JROTC
units. One important data point to be included in a cost benefit analysis to support
increasing NJROTC units is the cost savings associated with not having to discharge
a recruit early. The model in this research suggests that 45 percent of NJROTC Navy
accessions are more likely to be retained during their first term of enlistment over
their non-NJROTC counterpart. This, taken together with the direct costs to train an
NJROTC cadet, $5000, verses recruiting a non-NJROTC accession, $11,000, could
be modeled to determine whether Navy funds should be transferred from the Navy
Recruiting Command to NJROTC. Previous research on all the service JROTC
programs reports that the military could save almost $42 million annually. These
savings are primarily based on DOD estimates to recruit, train, and retain a military
accession (Laurence & Estrada, 2003).
A warning is offered in advance for those who may pursue cost benefit
analysis to support adding JROTC units as a recruiting tool. Cost benefit analysis has
been criticized for being a rational decision tool that is not suited to handle complex
social problems as well as providing non-normative solutions to normative social
problems (Patton, 1993). If this type of analysis were to be conducted, it would be
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important to conduct an added risk mitigation analysis based on recruiting being
added to the JROTC mission statement.
Since this research suggests that NJROTC should be considered as a
recruiting tool, a question worth asking is what would happen if the Navy changed its
stance by declaring NJROTC was also to be used as a recruiting tool. Answering this
question could be an ideal research project using survey instruments. The target of the
survey should be a strategic sampling of principals or stakeholders at high schools
with NJROTC units. In answering this question, one could forecast that certain units
would close if recruiting were to be added to the mission statement. Given the
likelihood that certain units may close and until further policy analysis is conducted,
Navy leaders should remain status quo with their stance that NJROTC is a citizenship
and leadership program. This is supported by the controversy in San Francisco where
the school board voted to close all JROTC units citing unequal treatment based on the
military's "Don't ask, don't tell" policy and the belief that JROTC is a military
recruiting tool (Barbassa, 2008). A recent non-binding ballot measure in November,
2008 supported retaining JROTC in San Francisco, though this vote does not mean
that JROTC will be retained (Johnson, 2008).
This study suggests that NJROTC participation is a good recruiting source for
under-represented minorities while showing empirical evidence that there is a strong
positive association with NJROTC participation and first term Navy retention. As far
as implications for continuing research, this dissertation's methodology can be used
annually to quantify the impact NJROTC has on accessions and retentions.
Additionally, it is recommended that research be conducted into why Black NJROTC
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accessions have decreased from seven percent greater than non-NJROTC accessions
to zero between 2001 to 2005. Recent reports from DMDC showed that all services
had declines in Black enlistment from 2002 - 2006. Sentiments from the Black
community, as mentioned earlier, indicate the reason behind the drop in Black
enlistments is based on the Black communities' disapproval of the war in Iraq
(Philpott, 2007).
While the NJROTC program not only teaches high school students leadership
and citizenship as defined in the NJROTC mission statement, it also instructs them
about life in the Navy and Marine Corps. This, anecdotally, suggests that NJROTC
could be used as a pipeline-training tool in that NJROTC fulfils the role of a Navy
orientation program. Further research may be warranted on the savings realized by
decreasing recruit training time for NJROTC graduates.
Based on research question four of this research, 40 percent of NJROTC
graduates who intended to enlist per the JUMS database actually enlisted per the
DMDC database. This discrepancy was found when attempting to link NJROTC
intention from the JUMS database and the actual accession data from the DMDC
database. To address this discrepancy further research is warranted into why the
Navy JUMS database does not match the DMDC accession data. As mentioned
earlier in this dissertation this could be easily resolved if social security information
was available on NJROTC graduates. However, due to Privacy Act reasons Social
Security numbers were not available for this research.
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The final research recommendation is to have the other services replicate this
research to determine the impact their JROTC programs have on accessions and
retentions.
Conclusion
The analysis of the Navy JROTC Unit Management System and Defense
Management Data Center data adds quantitative evidence of NJROTC graduate intent
data and Navy accessions and retentions data that do not exist in the current JROTC
literature. The findings indicate that NJROTC is good recruiting source for Navy
accessions and that NJROTC has positive influence on Navy retentions. It is the
conclusion of this research, that since 1964, the Navy JROTC program continues to
provide a worthy benefit of citizenship and leadership training to high school students
while at the same time resulting in a recruitment benefit to the Navy.
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Navy JROTC Unit Management System (JUMS) Data
The JUMS database includes variables that record NJROTC graduate career intent
data. NJROTC program managers (Pensacola, Florida) maintain the database. Each
NJROTC Unit collects career intent data annually on graduating seniors and records them
into the JUMS database. The JUMS database also provides NTSC with up-to-date
information on student enrollment demographics and financial accounting of the unit
expenses. The JUMs data have been recorded since 1994, but they have only been in a
computer accessible database since 2000. Thus, the 6 years obtained for this study range
from 2000 to 2005. The relevant data for this study on graduating career intent include
the following:
1. Race (Black, White, Hispanic, Asian and Other)
2. Location of Unit (NJROTC Geographic Area)
3. Gender
4. Post High School Career Intention Variables
a. Enlisted by service
b. Officer entry programs by service
c. Two-year college
d. Four-year college
e. Trade/vocational
f. Employment
g. Undecided
h. Other
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Defense Data Management Center (DMDC) Data
The DMDC is divided into five main sections: (a) Databases/Files, (b) Operational
Programs, (c) Data Delivery Systems, (d) Published Reports, and (e) Historical/Files.
The data for my research were drawn from the enlisted accession's database. The
population data for this study were Navy enlisted accessions divided into five cohort files
between Fiscal Year 2001 and 2005. One of the key identifiers in the cohort files is
"Youth Program," in which NJROTC cadets are categorized as one of the variables.
Each cohort file contains 65 variables. The following variables were analyzed to
determine whether there are any significant differences among NJROTC cadets, other
service JROTC cadets, and non-JROTC students:
1. Social Security number (scrambled to ensure anonymity)
2. Accession date
3. Separation date
4. Separation code (reason for separation)
5. Location of enlistment (Zip code and State)
6. Race (Black, White, Asian, Other)
7. Ethnic (divided into 20 variables of interest)
8. Youth Program (JROTC, Sea Cadet, ROTC, and Cadet Air Patrol)
9. Mental Group (based on Armed Force Qualification Test (AFQT) scores).
AFQT is designed to measure the trainability of potential recruits. The categories
are sub-divided into percentiles based on a potential recruit's score on the test:
CAT I: 93 to 99%; CAT II: 65 to 92%; CAT IIIA: 50 to 64%; CAT IIIB: 31 to
49%; CAT IV: 10 to 30%; and CAT V: 1 to 9%.

APPENDIX C
MEANS TESTING OF SAMPLE DATA

MEANS TESTING OF SAMPLE DATA
1. The tables below represent the means for the population and sample data for Zip
codes that had missing Median Income data. The independent variable is Median
Income, and the predictor variables are RACE, NJROTC, SPD SEPARATED OR
NOT, GENDER, 5 US REGIONS, and AFQT NEW. Table CI the population data
and Table C2 is the sample data. The purpose of this means test is to determine
whether the missing data median income data for 2,239 Navy accessions has a
significant impact on the six-predictor variables that will be used in the logistic
regression model for Research Question 3.

Table CI. Descriptive Statistics of the Population Mean Data (2001-2003)
Descriptive Statistics
Mean
49966.61

Median Income

Std. Deviation
68218.270

N
134300

i RACE

1.81

: NJROTC
\ SPD SEPARATED

1.99

1.145
.087

134300
134300

.27

.444

134300

.17

.377
1.414

134300
134300
134300

; OR NOT
| GENDER
5 US REGIONS
| AFQTNEW

3.02
2.97

.996

Table C2. Descriptive Statistics of the Sample Mean Data (2001-2003)
Descriptive Statistics
1

Median Income
RACE
NJROTC
SPD SEPARATED
OR NOT
GENDER
5 US REGIONS
AFQTNEW

Std. Deviation |
Mean
49966.62 i
68794.140 !
1.145 I
1.81 |
.087 !
1.99 I
i
.444 J
.27

132061

.17 I

.377 |

132061

3.01 |
2.97

1.407 ;
.995 i

132061
132061

N
132061
132061
132061

2. The means for our six variables, RACE, NJROTC, SPD SEPARATED OR NOT,
GENDER, 5 US REGIONS, and AFQT NEW between Table CI and C2 are the same
except for the 5 US REGIONS, which has a difference of .01. The means test of this
variable is below, which resulted in concluding that the sample mean of this variable
was not different from the population mean.
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a. Hypothesis:
• The Null Hypothesis: The population mean is 3.01
• The Alternate Hypothesis: The sample mean is not 3.01
b. Level of significance is .01
c. Test statistic Z test - the value nearest to.4950 is 2.58
d. Decision rule - Do not reject the null hypothesis if Z falls between -2.58
and 2.58. Reject the null hypothesis if Z falls outside of-2.58 or 2.58.
e. z = Sample Mean - Population Mean / Standard Deviation of population /
the square root of the sample population:
z = -2.57001
f.

Because -2.57 does not fall within the rejection region (< -2.58 and >
2.58) the null hypothesis is not rejected and we can conclude that the
sample mean is not different from the population mean.

Given that the other means: RACE; NJROTC; GENDER; and SPD (Separation
Program Designation) SEPARATED OF NOT, and AFQTNEW are the same, one
can conclude that the missing data in the Median Income variable has no significant
impact on the variables used in the logistic regression model for Research Question 3.

